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ABSTRACT
This project analyses the determination of profitability in 
the United Kingdom brewing industry during the period 
1972-1982. It is based on a. sample of fifteen brewing 
companies including the major national and regional 
companies.
The study examines previous literature on the determination 
of profitability in industry in general, and the brewing 
industry in particular. (PIMS: Schoeffler 1977, Price 
Commission, 1977) It examines in some depth the debate as 
to whether higher market-share leads to greater- 
profitability, and analyses the belief that an industry 
study should look at groups of firms within industries 
rather than aggregated data across industries. (Hatten and 
Schendel 1977. Porter 1980 and Woo 198*1)
The study looks at the effect on profitability of 
nine independent variables paying special attention to the 
effects of market-share. The analysis categorises firms 
into strategic groups using a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative data. It also compares and contrasts 
the results with the experiences of the Dutch and United 
States brewing industries.
The results suggest that the size (in terms of turnover) of 
the brewery company determines the strategies they pursue 
and how these strategies affect profitability. A U-shaped 
curve relationship between market-share and profiability is 
identified and strategic groups are determined on the basis 
of how similar the brewers adopted strategies were during 
the study period. The results show the problems of 
transfering a methodology from one industry to another.
In comparison to the Dutch and United States 
experiences, the United Kingdom brewers have been subject 
to a more volatile industry environment due mainly to 
changing consumer tastes. The expensive manufacturing and 
marketing strategies adopted by the national brewers in 
an attempt to capitalize on these changes led to their 
generally lower profitability when compared to the regional 
and small brewers during the study period.
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SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
Aims of the investigation
This study aims to assess the determination of 
profitability in the United Kingdom brewing industry 
through analysis of a number of key manufacturing, 
marketing and market environment variables. The analysis 
aims to identify strategic groups of brewers (those that 
compete in a similar way) from a sample of fifteen national 
and regional companies.
Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data 
the analysis will attempt to explain how and why different 
companies and groups of companies experienced differing 
levels of profitability during the 1972-1982 period. The 
study will also provide the opportunity to evaluate the 
Hatten and Schendel's (1977) methodology used in analysis
The analysis will compare the findings on the UK with the 
experiences of the United States and Dutch brewing 
industries to see what similarities and differences might 
exist between them.
RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS WORK
This study is related to previous work in three main 
ways:
1. It looks at the determination of profitability in 
the UK brewing industry. The PIMS programme 
(Schoeffler, 1977) suggested nine key variables 
that determine profitability. These including 
market-share and investment intensity. This work 
suggested that the greater the market-share the higher 
the profitability but used only across-industry data. 
Subsequent work (Hamermesh et al 1978 and Woo 198/1-) 
suggested that small share firms could also be 
highly profitable, (also using across industry data). 
The Price Commission (1977), in analysing the UK 
brewing industry, identified a negative relationship 
between market-share and investment with profitability. 
It found that costs related to administration, 
distribution and promotion also have an important 
role to play.
2. It will utilize the same methodology that Hatten and 
Schendel (1977) used in their analysis of the US 
brewing industry. Hatten and Schendel placed firms into 
similar or homogeneous groups based on the similarity 
of the effect of 8 key variables on profitability. The 
effect of these variables on the identified strategic
groups was then analysed. They found that different 
variables affected the companies in different ways 
according to their strategic grouping.
3. The analysis will refer to previous studies of 
profitability determination in two international 
markets. the United States (Keithahan, 1978, Hatten & 
Schendel, 1977 and Hatten and Hatten, 1982) and the 
Netherlands (Brouwer 1976), comparing their findings to 
those of the United Kingdom.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH
The study has two main areas of importance:
1. The understanding of determinants of profitability on an 
empirical and industry-specific basis, rather than 
using aggregated information from a number of different 
industries (as used by PIMS).
2. The value of transferring a methodology from one 
country to another.
1. Strategic marketing planning techniques such as 
Portfolio analysis (Henderson, 1970), Business position/ 
market attractiveness assessment (Rothchild, 1976)and 
PIMS (op.cit) suffer from two pitfalls:
a. The assumption that higher market-share necessarily 
leads to higher profitability.
b. The use of across industry rather than than single 
industry data.
These above techniques assume that higher market-share 
is a desirable or necessary goal. Moreover, although the 
PIMS study does use considerable empirical data, 
compared to Portfolio analysis and Business postion/ 
Market attractiveness assessment it actually only looks
at aggregated data from a whole range of industries, 
thus ignoring the particular circumstances of individual 
industries.
This study will show that the assumption that high 
market-share is beneficial to a business is not always 
necessarily so. The study will be of an empirical nature 
but based on the experiences of dust one industry. 
Although qualitative data will be incorporated, this 
information will only supplement the quantitative 
analysis.
Managers are more interested in how changes in 
market-share and other variables affect their company in 
their particular industry, rather than across 
industries. The single industry, empirically based, 
analysis should be more relevant to "real life" 
situations.
2. One of the important aspects of the study is to test the 
transfer of a methodology from the same industry but to 
a different context. That is, from the United 
States brewing industry to the United Kingdom brewing 
industry. Part of it utilizes the methodology devised 
by Hatten and Schendel to analyse the US brewing 
industry. If their methodology is not easily 
transferable, the conclusions will cast doubts on its 
claim to be a useful tool of analysis. The question of
the adherence to statistical analysis only, in industry 
studies, will also be discussed. This is important since 
many practitoners in industry see business theory and 
research as "fine on paper but of little use in 
practice." Interviews with managers in the industry will 
provide information on how relevant this kind of 
analysis might be for the brewing industry.
OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
The research progresses through the following phases: 
1. A discussion of previous literature on strategic 
marketing planning; the relationship between market 
share and profitability; and the role of competitor 
analysis.
2. A discussion on profitability in the Dutch, United 
States and United Kingdom brewing industries and recent 
studies of these industries.
3. An analysis of the relationship between market-share and 
profitability in the United Kingdom brewing industry.
The utilization of Hatten and Schendel ' s method to 
place firms into strategic groups according to influence 
by seven key manufacturing, marketing and market 
environment variables on firm profitability.
5. A further analysis of the relationship between the 
seven key variables with firm size and profitability; 
using a visual inspection of scattergrams.
6. The use of qualitative data from interviews to comfirm 
the groups found in the previous analysis.
7. Conclusions
SECTION TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
(Porter 1980) The profitability of Porter's groups depends 
on the circumstances of the industry in which they are 
operating, with competitive forces affecting different 
groups in different ways. Developments in this field have 
been very much influenced by the general change in market 
environment since the early 1960s.
The changing marketing environment
Much of the change in strategic marketing planning has been 
caused by the development of slower growth economies in the 
mid seventies, as a result of the oil crisis and the 
decreasing proportion of truly free markets (Day, 1983). 
Day says that;
"the 1960s was the era of marketing's greatest 
influence and promise, when a marketing orientation was 
accepted as an essential element of profitable progress 
in growing markets. Because of the inadequacies of 
corporate long range planning (Ansoff 1980), the 
marketing plan became an influential instrument for 
strategic change by guiding the product-market choice 
of the firms... During the 1970s the influence of 
marketing noticeably waned, while strategic planning 
was in ascendance. First, the pressure of environmental 
changes forced many firms towards a financially driven 
portfolio logic, within the context of an 
organisational framework where the strategic business 
unit -was the focal point of analysis and planning. 
Consequently the strategic emphasis shifted to 
consolidating strong competitive positions and 
conserving scarce resources." (Day op.cit, PP79-80)
Another important shift away from traditional consumer 
orientated marketing was the move to much stronger 
competitor orientation since " the benefits of a marketing 
exchange depend on the ability of each prospective supplier
to create and sustain a competitive advantage over all 
other competitors... This has created the case for an 
extra dimension in marketing analysis, bringing the 
marketing function under the control of the strategic goal 
of "sustainable competitive advantage." (ibid, p82) As a 
result marketing as a discipline was in many respects 
absorbed into the overall strategic plan of the business 
entity. The Business Position assessment and work of PIMS 
which followed calls for an integrated M overall picture" 
of both the market and the financial position of the 
business involved.
The next section of the review looks at formal 
strategic marketing methods and the importance of market 
share as a determinant of profitability. Much of the 
following analysis can be found in more detail in Abell and 
Hammond (op.cit).
Portfolio Analysis
Portfolio analysis was popularized by the Boston 
Consultancy Group (1968) to meet the planning requirements 
of multi-product, multi-market companies. The analysis 
assumes each product will have its own strategy and that 
resources should be allocated between products to optimise 
corporate performance. so that those needing help receive 
financial support from those that do not. The rationale
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behind this method is that by breaking down large 
multi-product corporations into decentralized profit 
centres. each will then be treated as if it is an 
independent business. It differs from most other 
integrative planning techniques in that strategic roles 
for each product are assigned on the basis of the product's 
market growth rate and market share relative to 
competition. The objective is to get the best overall 
performance from the portfolio, while ensuring cash flow 
is in balance.
Market share is measured as relative share This is the 
ratio of the firm's unit sales of a product to the unit 
sales of a similar product by the firm's largest 
competitor, which gives a ratio of the two companies' 
market shares.
This method of analysis makes four assumptions;
1. The margins and cash generated increase with relative 
market-share, due to economies of experience (BCG 1972) 
and scale.
2. Sales growth requires cash input to finance 
additional capacity and working capital. Thus if 
market-share is maintained, cash input requirements will 
increase with the market growth rate.
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3. An increase in market-share usually requires cash input 
to support increased advertising expenditure, lower 
prices and other share saining tactics. The opposite is 
true for a decrease in share.
Growth in each market will slow as the product 
approaches maturity.
5. That there is a limit on cash flow/ finance available
and it assumes that all products are internally
financed.
Fig 2.1
Product catagories in the product portfolio chart
HIGH
Growth 
rate
LOW
"Star"
Modest cash flow
"Cow" 
Positive cash flow
"Problem child" 
Negative cash flow
"Dog" 
Modest cash flow
HIGH LOW
Market-Share
Source: Abell and Hammond 1979
The growth share matrix
The method used for showing the companies' product 
portfolio is the Growth/Share matrix. This plots the 
relationship between the revenue of a product (per annumn), 
its relative market share and the growth rate of the market 
in which the product competes. Depending on the product
12
position, it can be classified in one of four categories as 
shown in Fig 1.1.
With these positions within the industry four basic 
strategies can be pursued with each given product; building 
share, holding share, harvesting or withdrawal. Which 
strategy is appropriate depends on the product's cost and 
market position as well as its relationship to competing 
products. A simplified resume of these strategies in the 
context of the market position and product life cycle stage 
is shown in table 1.
Table 2.. 1 Basic Strategies appropriate for various
life cycle stages and competitive positions
COMPETITIVE 
POSITION
LEADER 
(HIGH SHARE)
GROWTH
FOLLOWER 
(LOW SHARE)
Building share 
by reducing 
prices to 
discourage new 
competitive 
capacity.
PRODUCT LIFE STAGE 
MATURITY
Hold share 
by improving 
quality 
increasing 
sales effort 
and adverts
Utilize own 
capacity 
fully adding 
in anticipation 
of needs.
Invest to 
increse share.
Concentrate 
on a segment 
which can be 
dominated.
Withdraw, or 
hold share 
by keeping 
prices and 
costs below 
the market 
leaders.
DECLINE
Harvest: 
maximize 
cash flow 
by reducing 
investment 
and adverts, 
development 
etc (market 
share will 
decline ) .
Withdraw 
from the 
market.
Source: Abell and Hammond, 1979
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Strategic analysis of the product portfolio
A six step strategic analysis of the firm f s portfolio can 
be derived from the growth share matrix and it is briefly 
described below.
1. An even distribution of products should be maintained, 
with the majority of sales being from market leading 
"cash cows" to provide cash to underwrite the other 
products.
2. Trends should be identified from the path which each 
product has taken over the previous years (at least 5) 
to plan and decide on future movements.
3. Matrices should be developed for competitors products 
and compared to the company's own. This will of course 
be more difficult due to limited access to data.
tl. Factors should be considered that are not covered in the 
portfolio analysis, eg management methods. (In some ways 
this shows the limitations of portfolio analysis which 
the other two strategic methods do take account of.)
5. Develop possible "target" portfolios, to decide in which 
direction products should develop given the information 
collected from the previous four steps.
1U
6. Check cash flow balance between the products to ensure 
that the intended strategies will be financed correctly 
ie a strongly supported product has enough cash from 
products that are making surplus cash.
Problems and limitations of portfolio analysis
Abell (op.cit) points out two assumptions that portfolio 
analysis makes which may not be necessarily true.
The two assumption are that:
1. Cash flow from operations of products with higher 
relative market shares will be stronger than those with 
smaller shares. This supposed relationship between 
relative market-share and cash flow may be weak when:
a. experience or scale effects are low,
b. value added is relatively low,
c. a competitor has a low cost source of purchased
materials unrelated to relative share position, 
d. other strategic factors like product quality may be
important, 
e. there are differing capacity utilization rates.
2. Cash needs for products in rapidly growing markets will 
be greater than the cash needs for those in slower
15
growing ones. This assumed relationship between industry 
growth rate and cash flow may be weak when;
a. capital intensity is low,
b. entry barriers are high (not simultaneously with a),
c. price competition depresses margins in maturity so that
even though finance needs decline, cash flow
deteriorates,
d. legal intervention holds down profits in maturity, 
e. seasonal or cyclical factors produce short run
supply-demand imbalances which affect profit and cash
flow.
With this number of exceptions it is clear that 
information outside the portfolio matrix would have to be 
drawn on. This shows its limitation, and although it is a 
useful framework in which to consider broad alternatives, 
it cannot to be used on its own to assess the costs and 
benefits of strategic moves. Cash flow may not be as 
important as return on investment (ROI) as a basis for 
comparing the attractiveness of investing in one business 
or another. (Although it is understood that cash flow is 
more likely to be used for making comparisons of efficiency 
rather than ROI f s major use in making investment 
decisions).
A further problem is that there is little empirical 
evidence to suggest that the two major assumptions are
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correct. Beck(1980) points out that it also assumes that 
growth in an expanding market is preferable to growth in a 
mature or declining market. A major problem with this 
kind of analysis is that it looks only at the cash 
generated by the products, and neglects to look in detail 
at company structural variables or the strategy of 
competing firms. Although it treats product strategy as if 
inter-related it does not relate this to other aspects of 
the overall corporate strategy.
Market attractiveness-business position assessment analysis
The shortcomings in portfolio analysis are in some ways 
compensated for by the market attractiveness-business 
position assessment which uses a matrix of "market 
attractiveness" and "business postion". It also uses 
considerably more factors in assessing the market and the 
business than the portfolio analysis.
Investment decisions are made according to the position of 
individual business units in the matrix, ie their strength, 
and the attractiveness of the market. The factors that 
determine an "attractive" market and a "strong" business 
unit are set out in appendix 3. For example the 
determination of a business unit's strength depends upon 
such factors as that business' market-share, the 
bargaining power of its suppliers and buyers as well as the
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level of scale and experience of the business. Measures of 
market attractiveness include its growth, profit margins 
and market size. The analysis involves three formal steps:
1. The relevant, contributing factors in any given 
situation must be identified. The problem is in deciding 
which factors are relevant. The selection of the factors 
to be included in the matrix relies on managerial 
judgement and hence a weakness of the analysis.
2. The direction and form of these relationships must be 
determined, ie what makes a market "attractive". This 
once again relies on managerial Judgement.
3. The contributing factors need to be weighted depending 
on their relative importance. Again, the only way this 
can be achieved is by judgement based assessment.
The current position of the business in the matrix can then 
be plotted. More difficult is the plotting of the future 
position of the business which relies heavily on 
expectations and subjective Judgements on a host of factors 
including competitor and consumer actions and reactions. 
Once this information is compiled one of three strategic 
alternatives can be adopted: investing to hold market 
position, investing to penetrate alternative markets, or 
investing to rebuild a lost market.
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PIMS (Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy)
PIMS was established in the early 1970s to determine the 
impact of marketing strategies on profit. The first phase 
used empirical evidence from 350 businesses in a variety of 
industries. Information was gathered covering industry and 
market characteristics as well as financial operating 
results. A computer based regression model identified the 
most important factors and how each factor was related to 
performance and weighted them according to their relative 
importance. This method was devised to overcome the three 
problems market-attractiveness/business-position assessment 
had;
1. The factors that impact on "attractiveness" or 
"position" have to be identified by the analyst.
2. The strength and direction of the relationship between a 
particular factor and attractiveness or position has to 
be assessed by judgement.
3. Overall assessment of attractiveness of position depend 
on some implicit or explicit "weighting" of the 
different factors involved.
The PIMS method used both ROI and cash flow as measures of 
performance and established 37 key profit infuences. 
(Schoeffler. 1977).
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The current PIMS data bank draws on empirical experiences 
of over 1700 product and service businesses operated by 
around 200 customers in the US and Europe. From this data 
base the PIMS project expects to estimate the "approximate 
results (within 3-5 points of after tax ROD of most 
businesses (close to 90%) over a moderatly long period (3-5 
years) on the basis of observable characteristics of the 
market and of the strategies employed by the business 
itself and its competitors". (Schoeffler, 1977, pi)
The findings and problems of the PIMS method.
The PIMS findings show that the "characteristics" of the 
served market, of the business itself, and of its 
competitors, constitute about 80% of the reasons for 
success or failure, and the operating skill or luck of 
the mangeraent constitute about 20%" (ibid, p2). PIMS cites 
nine major influences on cash flow and pre-tax ROI (ibid 
p3) which can be weighted in terms of importance into two 
groups which will be discussed in more detail later.
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Table 2.2
The PIMS identified influences on profitability
Group a
Investment intensity 
Market position 
Productivity 
Quality
Group b
Innovation/differentation 
Growth of served market 
Vertical integration 
Cost push 
Current strategic effort
Schoeffler(ibid) asserts that it is not the product that is 
important but the characteristics of the business; two 
businesses making entirely different products, but having 
similar investment intensity, productivity, market position
etc will usually show similar operating results. This
assertion tries to answer doubts as to whether the same 37 
factors, or even the nine most important factors, predict 
performance in equal measure in for example a service 
industry or a manufacturing industry. Bass (1974.) asked 
whether "it was appropriate to pool data from a sample of 
firms from different industries in estimating the long run 
relationship?" (pi) Bass's study of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) data (1969) on consumer products showed 
strong evidence to support the conclusion that the
relationship between industry structure (ie
Advertising/Sales ratio, concentration, industry demand 
etc) and profitability are not homogeneous for all firms 
utilized in the FTC study.
However Schoeffler(op.cit) maintains that certain
fundamental characteristics are true for all busi ness
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situations. In this respect PIMS differs from portfolio 
analysis and market attractiveness/business position 
assessment in that it draws on pooled empirical data, which 
are very comprehensive in scope, and not individual 
business situations, as part of the final analysis. Its 
results are appealing in that the determinates of 
profitibility are identified so clearly.
The PIMS identified major influences on profiability and 
cash flow
Investment Intensity
"Investment Intensity generally produces a negative 
impact on percentage measures of profitability and net 
cash flow and businesses that are highly investment 
intensive are much less profitable than businesses with 
lower levels of investment per dollar of sales." 
(Schoeffler 1977. P3)
It would be expected that those businesses prepared to make 
substantial investment would reap the benefits through 
higher profitablity (ROI). However Schoeffler(ibid) 
explains that the high investment business x operate in 
highly competitive situations with price wars and expensive 
advertising budgets to maintain full capacity. If the 
business is aggressive enough high capital intensity should 
pay off in the long run, especially if the business remains 
one move ahead of its competitors. PIMS suggests that to 
avoid the effects of this problem it is best to concentrate 
on segments of the total potential market. This is the 
basis for the "served market" which PIMS use as their
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market-share definition (see market position). This will 
ensure that investment expenditure is concentrated on a 
particular area which can be dominated and thus reap the 
expected advantages of market leadership in their served 
market. Savings in labour and other costs must also be made 
to make new capital investment worthwhile.
Productivity
"Businesses producing high value added per employee are 
more profitable than those with low value added per 
employee. Productivity is especially profitable to the 
extent that it does not require additional 
investment"(ibid, P3).
However this also depends on the invetment intensity of the 
business. Those making efficient use of capital investment 
may not need to maintain such high value added per 
employee.
Market Position
The PIMS "Basic Fact" (Schoeffler op.cit) states that 
"businesses with a high share of their served market are 
generally, and often considerably more profitable than 
those with a low share." (pi) PIMS emphasises the 
importance of "served market" rather than the total 
potential market. Served market is defined as;
"the specific segment of the total potential market in 
which the business is making a serious competitive 
attempt, by offering a product or service that is 
suitable for that segment and by addressing its 
marketing effort to that segment." (ibid. p2)
The problem with the measure "served market" is that it 
ignores potential markets which, even though data may be 
difficult to collect on them, must be of major importance 
in either rapid growth industries or for a business in a 
stagnant industry looking for expansion.
Given the difficulties in defining market share the PIMS 
findings are very clear; Buzzell et al (1975) found that an 
average increase of 10% in market share was accompanied by 
an increase of about 5% in pre tax ROI. However this very 
positive relationship may alter in the following 
circumstances:
1. Market share is more important for infrequently 
purchased products than for freqently purchased 
products. Infrequently purchased products tend also to 
be high cost items. ie Hi-Fi equipment as compared to
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beer*.
2. Market share is more important to businesses when buyers 
are fragmented rather than concentrated (ie no small 
group of buyers account for a significant proportion of 
total sales).
The problem with this is that the analysis is across 
industries and will tend not to pick up industry-specific 
information and variations. The PIMS method is fairly 
dismissive of this kind of information. The market share 
debate is extensive and I will return to it later, suffice 
to say that PIMS draw on information from predominantly 
large businesses during a period of stable economic growth. 
The effect of concentration is not accounted for, athough 
Gale and Branch (1982) found that market share was a 
considerably greater influence on profitability than 
industry concentration.
The PIMS project believes that there are three reasons why 
increased market-share improves profitability.
1. Economies of scale leading to lower costs: however this 
fails to realize that diseconomies of scale may set in 
at any time, but these are dependent on the nature of 
the industry, and thus cannot be detected at the 
inter-industry level.
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2. The experience effect; businesses that have held high 
share for a long time have been able to move further 
down the learning curve.
3« Bargaining power; the high share business is less likely 
to be intimidated by competitors and customers into 
lower prices and can better reap the benefits of greater 
efficiency and higher quality.
However the influence of these factors are hard to gauge 
and their positive effects cannot be proven.
The logical conclusion to this reasoning suggests that 
there is no point in being in an industry if the business 
is not the market leader or has the potential to be the 
market leader. However as I will discuss later, success for 
non-market leaders is dust as likely and equally rewarding 
as success for the market leader. (Woo and Cooper, 1982)
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Quality of the products and/or services offered.
This is defined as the customer's evaluation of the 
business 1 product/service package as compared to that of 
competitors. Quality normally has a positive impact on 
financial performance. Quality products can sell for a 
higher price and therefore gain greater profit, but tend to 
forfeit market share. However Chussil and Schoeffler (1978) 
suggest foregoing some of the premium price in order to 
gain share as this will lead to overall greater 
profitability. The quality-share trade-off depends on the 
business* original position in the industry. For example 
"snob value" will produce an inverse price demand curve for 
certain luxury items, which may damage a specialized 
business, eg fur coats. The problem with this factor is 
that measurement of relative quality is determined by the 
business' manager's perception of the customers evaluation 
and not by an independent arbiter.
Growth of the served market
"This is generally favourable to dollar measures of 
profit, indifferent to percent measure of profit and 
negative to all measures of net cash flow"(Schoeffler 
op.cit, p3)
Innovation/differentiation
"Effort in this area is only rewarded if that business has 
strong market postion to begin with." (ibid, pU. ) The 
problem with this is that it implies that businesses not 
in the lead position should not bother with research and 
development or innovation. Woo and Cooper (op.cit) consider 
that this kind of effort by non-leaders in the right 
direction can bring very positive returns. (See chapter 8)
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Vertical integration
"For businesses located in mature and stable markets, 
vertical integration generally impacts favorably on 
performance. In markets that are rapidly growing, 
declining or changing in any way the opposite is 
true" . (Schoef f ler op.cit, pit)
Cost push
"The rates of increase of wages, salaries and raw 
material prices and the presence of Trade Unions, have 
complex impacts on profit and cash flow, depending on 
how the business is positioned to pass along the increse 
to its customers, and to absorb the higher costs 
internally" (ibid, p/l).
It is surprising that PIMS studies have not considered 
costs to be more important and dismiss them as 
unpredictable in their effect. The weakness of PIMS is 
shown when it ignores differences that exist between 
industries.
Current Strategic effort.
"The current direction of change of any of the previous 
factors has effects on profit and cash flow that are 
frequently opposite to that of the factor itself. For 
example, having strong market share tends to increase 
net cash flow but getting share drains cash while the 
business is making that effort." (ibid,
Since PIMS identifies a strong relationship between 
market-share and profitability, businesses ought to set 
market-share objectives in the form of the following three 
strategies :
1. Building strategies
The aim being to increase market share by way of new 
product introduction, increased marketing effort etc.
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The PIMS results point to the following findings;
a. In most markets there is a minimum share that is 
required for viability.
b. Big increases in share are rarely achieved quickly, and 
building strategies are likely to be expensive in the 
short run.
c. Businesses contemplating building share should consider 
the cost in terms of capital investment, promotion and 
government intervention. If the costs of building are 
too high holding strategies should be considered.
2. Holding strategies
For a low share business this might involve reduced 
prices achieved by reduced R&D spending with the 
opposite for a high share business.
3. Harvesting strategies
Aimed at achieving high short-term earnings and cash 
flow by allowing market share to decline. Harvesting is 
often a matter of necessity rather than choice and 
generally only large-share businesses can harvest 
successfully.
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Summary
The PIMS programme is much more comprehensive than the 
previous two methods. Analysis of the vast data bank has 
been able to account for over &Q% of observed variation in 
profitability. However PIMS fails to address the need for 
specific actions to reach a new strategic position, and 
instead just suggests only vague strategic improvements 
that may need to be made. PIMS does not provide any 
information on the actions of individual competitors, 
instead the information is based on across-industry 
aggregates. PIMS does not provide much insight into the 
impact of future changes in the market. The previous two 
methods do provide this insight, but without the empirical 
backing that PIMS has. Finally, the terms "Business" and 
"Market" can be difficult to define.
Problems with PIMS
The PIMS programme throws up three important areas for 
discussion:
1. The importance of market-share to profitability
2. The role of competitor analysis
3. Across-industry versus industry-specific analysis.
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The importance of market share to profitability
Portfolio analysis assumed, and PIMS showed, that market 
share has a key role to play in the determination of a 
business* success, whether in terms of improved cash flow 
or higher ROI. However both methods were devised during a 
sustained period of stable economic growth. Buzzell et al 
(op.cit) used data for 1970-1972 which were good years in 
the US economy, and today's environment is quite 
different. Most of the companies involved in the analysis 
were very large in terms of market share (25% or more) and 
thus tended to be representative of industries of a highly 
concentrated nature.
It seems doubtful whether a business can really define its 
own served market and the measurement would often have to 
be based on judgement. Rumelt and Wensley (1981) concluded 
that " it is not in market share but in product, management 
and (management's reaction to) exogenous events that the 
value of market share resides... market share is not in 
itself a valid strategic goal since it measures success 
otherwise created". (p2) Even though high market share can 
lead to greater profitability it does not necessarily do so 
nor does low share necessarily mean a business will not be 
adequatly profitable. I will return to some of these 
points in chapter 3.
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The role of competitor analysis
The PIMS analysis does not indicate the value of 
competitive actions of other businesses other than 
suggesting what the overall most successful strategies are. 
What the share-leaders are doing may not be the best thing 
for all businesses and PIMS provides no alternatives other 
than share leadership-orientated strategies. Portfolio 
analysis and market-attractiveness/ business position 
assessment do look at competitors but still emphasise the 
importance of gaining market share leadership. The 
importance of competitive analysis will be discussed in 
chapter *l.
Across-industry versus industry-specific analysis.
Of the three methods only PIMS looks across industries and 
only PIMS has such strong empirical backing. However this 
may be far from relevant if we take the following example. 
A business in an industry sees itself producing a high 
quality product with high ROI and yet only a twentieth of 
the share of the market leader. The leader has a low ROI 
with a higher priced, lower quality, product. How does the 
low share business react to the PIMS analysis that the low 
share business should aim for high share? This is a problem 
that is not effectively tackled by PIMS because data of 
single industries and groups of businesses within
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industries are not analysed .
Summary
The formal strategic planning methods can help to explain 
what determines profitability and steer a business to a 
more profitable position. Having said this it is apparent 
that all three formal methods have their draw-backs and 
cannot be used in isolation from one another.
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPORTANCE OF MARKET SHARE FOR PROFITABLITY
The PIMS findings on the power of market share suggest that
"companies with low market shares are doomed to marginal 
profits at best, while market share leaders show the 
best returns on investment.** (Woo & Cooper, 1982 p!06)
They continue by saying that:
"If the conventional wisdom is correct... most companies 
would be candidates for harvesting or liquidation. 
However, many companies with low market shares survive 
and even prosper.'* (ibid p!06)
The PIMS advice to businesses with a small share is to 
either build share, harvest or divest from the industry. 
The logical outcome of this advice would leave only one 
business in any one industry. Since this is not the 
case in general, low share businesses must have some 
incentive to stay in industry.
The findings of Hamermesh et al (1978)
The above PIMS assumption ignores the fact 1rhat "in many 
industries, companies having a low market share 
consistently out-perform their larger rivals and show very 
little inclination to either expand their share or withdraw 
from the fight. "p/J.8 (ibid) Hamermesh looked at a sample 
of three businesses that had above-average return on equity 
and net profit margins but still held less than half
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the industry leader's share. Four characteristics were 
identified which were common to each of these businesses 
which helps to explain why they enjoyed above average 
profit levels:
1. Segmentation
The companies were able to direct attention to specific 
markets and customers, competing in segments where its 
own strengths would be most highly valued and where its 
large competitors were unlikely to compete. The PIMS 
argument suggests that this is what they would consider 
operating in their "served market." Once again defining 
the market is a problem.
2. Efficient use of research and development
Correctly channelled research and development into the 
segment that has been selected; that is, the area which 
is most likely to produce the greatest benefits for the 
business.
3. Thinking small
The pursuit of market-share is costly and profit rather 
than sales growth or market-share should be emphasised. 
Diversification should be pursued with caution as it can 
also be costly. Diversification into non-synergic 
businesses should be avoided.
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The ubiquitous chief executive
Such a person can drive a company during his/her 
leadership although it tends to leave problems if he/she 
should retire or leave the business.
Hamermesh et al realize the limitations of low share 
businesses identified by PIMS but still beleive that "not 
all low share businesses are f dogs'. ft p55
The findings of Woo and Cooper (1982)
Woo and Cooper based their research on a much larger number 
of businesses(UO) to find out what kinds of industry low 
share businesses are successful in, what kinds of products 
they offer and how they compete. The businesses in the 
sample were chosen from the PIMS data base and make a 
useful comparison to the original PIMS findings. These 
businesses, nearly all part of larger corporations, had to 
have at least 20% ROI and less than 20% of the combined 
share of their three largest competitors. Woo and Cooper 
grouped the businesses into six clusters of similar 
competitive environments and identified six characteristics 
common to such businesses.
1. Profitable low-market-share businesses exist in 
low-growth markets. These tend to provide a more stable 
environment with less intense competition.
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2. Their products do not change often; high levels of 
change are costly and the R&D required is prohibitive 
for low-share businesses.
3. Most of their products are standardized and they provide 
few extra services. This is a result of heavy 
consumer-focusing creating little need for product 
flexibility.
Most of them make industrial components or supplies. 
Close customer relations, low advertising costs and 
purchases governed by contract make this area more 
advantageous for the low share business.
5. The products and supplies are purchased frequently, 
a point also noted by Buzzell et al (op.cit)
6. Profitable low share businesses are in industries with 
high value added.
Most of these businesses compete using some or all of the 
following strategies;
1. A strong focus tailored to the market segments 
where the business 1 own strengths will be most highly 
valued. This is similar to Hamermesh's finding (op.cit).
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2. A reputation for high quality, complementing a medium to 
low relative price.
3. Low total costs arising from low relative marketing and 
R&D expenditure.
Conclusions
Not only do these two studies seriously challenge the PIMS 
findings and the assumptions of Portfolio analysis, but 
they also point out the advantages of disaggregating data 
to look at differences in competitive strategy. The 
suggestion is that building strategies alone cannot 
guarantee success for the business. Success depends on the 
line of business and the industry in which it operates.
The findings of Woo (198/1)
More recent work by Woo looked at a comparison of Ul low 
performing leaders (ROI less than 10%) and 71 high 
performing leaders (ROI over U0%), reaching the conclusion 
that "the benefits of dominance are not universally 
enjoyed." Woo found that low-return market leaders were to 
be found in regional and fragmented markets (20 or more 
competitors) where the advantages of economies of scale and 
high barriers to entry were at a minimum. Low return 
leaders were also found in greater numbers in unstable, low
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importance of the specific environment in these studies has 
taken preceedence over the advantages of high market-share 
and market-leadership. Actual definition of market-share 
also makes this kind of analysis difficult.

Cost advantages independent of scale (The experience
curve)
Access to distribution channels
Government policy
The sources are not static and can be altered by actions 
of the businesses in the industry and by factors 
outside, eg a change in government.
2. Power of suppliers
Suppliers can exert bargaining power on businesses in an 
industry by raising or reducing prices therefore 
affecting industry profitability. Suppliers' power 
depends on: how important the industry is to the 
supplier; how concentrated the suppliers are; how 
important the suppliers' product or variety of products 
is to the industry; and how likely the supplier is to 
integrate vertically into the industry.
3- Power of buyers
Customers can force down prices, demand higher quality 
or more service and play competitors off against each 
other. Buyer power depends on: the concentration of 
buyers; how differentiated the industry products are; 
the proportion of the buyers budget that the industry 
product has; and the likelihood of backward integration
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by buyers.
. Substitute products
Substitutes can put a limit on industry profits, unless 
the existing products can be differentiated to dispel 
the substitute effect. The more attractive the 
price-performance alternative offered by substitutes, 
the firmer the lid on industry profits.
5. Rivalry between businesses
Competition between businesses and groups of businesses 
will determine the individual and overall profitability 
in the industry. The intensity of competition is 
determined by the following factors, bearing in mind 
that the more intense the rivalry, the lower the 
profits:
a. Number of competitors, relative size and concentration
b. Growth rate of industry: high growth will lessen 
competition.
c. The degree of product differentiation: more 
differentiation,less price competition.
d. Fixed costs and durability of the product: determines
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price cutting.
e. Capacity augmentation: how easy and cheap is it to do?
f. Height of exit barriers: how easy is it to leave the 
industry?
g. Diversity of strategies: competing businesses have 
different ideas about how to compete.
Porter's three generic strategies
Given these forces, businesses in an industry have the 
option of three generic strategies with which to 
succeed. Each strategy works to create defensible positions 
for coping with the five competitive forces. These were 
briefly discussed in the previous chapter and are:
1. Overall cost leadership
2. Differentiation
3. Focus
1. Overall cost leadership: this is the most competitive 
and hardest strategy to adopt with a strong need for 
economies of scale, rigorous cost control and highly 
efficient plant utilization. Low cost must be 
accompanied by high turnover, thus high market share. 
PIMS would argue that this low cost position will yield 
the business above-average returns.
2. Differentiation: This entails differentiating the
/U
product or service offered by the business to create 
something that is perceived industry-wide as being 
unique. Differentiation achieves brand loyalty by 
customers and hence is less sensitive to price 
competition. Differentiation accepts a trade-off against 
market share but the profit margins are greater.
3- Focus: a business aims the product or service at a 
particular buyer group, area or other subsection of the 
overall market. The strategy rests on the premise that 
the business is able to serve its narrow strategic 
target more effectively or efficiently than competitors 
who are competing more broadly.
Identification of strategic groups
Up to this point Porter follows a similar model to the 
previous planning methods, with an identification of the 
determinants of profitability (the competitive forces) and 
three suggested strategies for businesses to adopt. However 
Porter suggests the need to subdivide an industry into 
strategic groups since not all businesses in an industry 
compete alike. These competitive forces will affect 
different competing groups in different ways, thus causing 
businesses to adopt particular strategies relevant to their 
position in the industy and within their strategic group.
Not all industries divide into "similar" groups of
businesses but normally similarities do exist based on the 
following list of possible strategic options open to a 
business in a given industry. Each business 1 strategy can 
be defined along these dimensions and strategic groups can 
be identified.
Specialization
Brand identification
Push vesus pull: brand identification with customers versus
support of distribution channels 
Channel selection 
Product quality 
Technological leadership 
Vertical integration 
Cost position
Degree of ancillary services provided 
Pricing policy
Degree of financial and operational leverage 
Relationship with parent company 
Relationship with home and host government
The characteristics of strategic groups
Porter continues by stating that it is not only the 
industry-wide barriers that need to be examined, but that 
entry barriers depend on the characteristics of each 
strategic group. Barriers not only protect businesses in a
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strategic group from entry by firms outside the industry, 
but they also provide barriers to businesses shifting from 
one strategic group to another. Factors that deter the 
movement of firms from one strategic position to another 
are known as mobility barriers. Thus businesses in 
strategic groups with high mobility barriers will have a 
greater profit potential than those in strategic groups 
with low mobility barriers.
Strategic groups will have differing amounts of power as 
regards suppliers and buyers, since their strategies will 
result in various degrees of vunerability and may involve 
dealing with different suppliers and buyers. Strategic 
groups may also face different threats from substitute 
products.
There are four factors in Porter's analysis which will 
determine how strongly the strategic groups in an industry 
will compete amongst each other for customers:
1. Degree of market interdependence among the groups, ie 
whether all groups are competing for the same customers.
2. Degree of product differentiation in each group.
3. The number of strategic groups and their relative size.
U.. The degree to which the strategies in different groups
SECTION THREE: PROFITABILITY IN THE BREWING INDUSTRY
CHAPTER 5: PROFITABILITY IN THE DUTCH BREWING INDUSTRY
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the experiences 
of the Dutch brewing industry to those of the UK. In 
particular to look at the determinants of profitability and 
the effect of certain key variables for the brewers of the 
Netherlands. It is intended that this analysis will 
highlight the observations made in the previous chapter 
pointing out the differences between industries in 
different circumstances. It will also show whether the PIMS 
findings are applicable to the Dutch experience which is 
very different to that of the UK brewing industry. Although 
some of the data in this chapter are rather old, 
(1970-1973) the market structure has not changed 
dramatically since then, and Heineken still hold around 
55X of the market. (Heineken report and accounts 1983 and 
Marketing in Europe 1982).
The Dutch beer market
There are a number of important characteristics to the 
Dutch beer market which are now discussed.
The Dutch beer market has a very low degree of physical
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product differentiation. with the vast majority of beer 
produced in the Netherlands being of the Pilsner type. 
Production of weaker table beer and extra strong beer has 
never been more than marginal, representing only 1.0% and 
0.4X respectively of total 1972 output. Table 5.1 shows 
that these proportions have not changed very much since 
then This single beer type dominance has meant that 
sub-markets are mostly created by brand promotion, 
advertising and packaging, eg Grolsch's swing top bottle.
Table 5.1
Beer production in the Netherlands. 1978-1981
(Hectolitres 'OOO) % change
1978 1979 1980 1981 1980/81
Table beer 66 61 63 65 + 3.2 
Pils 14,557 15.297 15,389 16,544 +7.5 
Strong beer 28 29 31 3O -3.2
Total 14,651 15.387 15.483 16,639 +7.5 
Source: Centraal BrouweriJ Kantoor (CBK)
Beer packaging
In the Netherlands packaged beer rather than draught beer 
is the most important source of sales. Also, a considerable 
proportion of beer is consumed at home rather than in 
hotels, restaurants or cafes. (See table 5-3) In the 
Netherlands since 1961 there has been a steady move from 
draught to packaged beer sold almost exclusively in 
returnable bottles. (Table 5-2) This is in contrast to the 
UK, but may reflect a possible future scenario for UK 
drinking habits if the trend for drinking at home continues
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to increase. In the UK at present however the vast majority
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to increase. In the UK at present however the vast majority 
of sales are still in draught form, sold in pubs. Because 
of this in UK it is the pub itself that tends to be the 
product, rather than the beer it sells, thus reducing the 
need for brand promotion.
Table 5.2
The changing proportion of packaged beer in the
Netherlands, 1961-1975 (% volume)
1961 58
1968 60
1970 63
1973 65
1975 68
Source: Annual Reports "Produktschap voor bier"
Table 5-3
The proportion of beer drunk in the Netherlands at home. 
19^0-1974 (X volume)
19^0 1960 197^
Home consumption 5 30 55
Horeca* 95 70 U5
Total 100 10O 100
* Hotels, resturants and cafes 
Source: Marketing in Europe
Ownership of licenced outlets
Like the UK, the ownership of licensed outlets in the 
Netherlands is heavily controlled by the brewers with 
around 60X of the Horeca sector being more or less tied to 
a specific brewery, who either own the premises, have 
provided financial aid, or have loaned or given the pumps
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and installations to the outlet
Regional variations
Regional variation in consumption is considerable with the 
highest consumption in the southern provinces of Limburg 
and Noord Brabant. It is in these areas that the majority 
of regional brewers are to be found, possibly reflecting a 
market more influenced by local brand loyalty than 
advertising. Comsumption is higher than the national 
average in th eastern part of the country, and the lowest 
occurs in the northern provinces of Groningen and 
Frelesland. Work on the demand for beer in the Netherlands 
(Leeflang and Van Duijn 1982) found that "instruments such 
as advertising volume and price were more effective in the 
West of the Netherlands than elsewhere. Broadly speaking 
the west versus the rest of the country dichotomy can be 
seen as an urban-rural one. 1 * They suggest that their 
results point to higher effectiveness of marketing 
instruments in urban and urbanized areas. It is the case 
that Heineken and Skol dominate the urban areas and are 
likely to see advertising as more cost effective in 
concentrated areas of population.
Changes in exports and consumption
The Netherlands has a remarkable record in exporting beer,
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almost entirely due to Heineken. 24.8% of total Dutch 
production was exported in 1981, with 3-3% of 
world wide beer sales attributable to Heineken. In 
return, foreign penetration into the Dutch beer market is 
very high with 27.0% of domestic sales being controlled by 
foreign brewers in 1974. As with the UK, over all sales in 
the Netherlands increased rapidly during the seventies, 
with an increase of 57% in the period 1970-1974. During the 
period 1978-1981 beer production increased at a steady 
rate, but decreased slightly from 1981-1982 due to a 100% 
increase in excise duty. This steady rise in production 
even after 1977 was the opposite to the UK experience and 
was probably due to two reasons. The Dutch economy did not 
undergo such a sharp decline during the late seventies and 
early eighties, and the per capita consumption of beer had 
started from a much lower base. Even by 1982 consumption 
per head in the Netherlands was 89.6 litres as commpared to 
111.5 litres in the UK.
Summary
The Dutch beer market has a number of important aspects:
1. The vast majority of beer is of one type.(Pilsner lager)
2. A high proportion of beer is consumed at home and in a 
packaged form (mostly returnable bottles).
3. The brewers have considerable control over outlets, but 
the trend for independent supermarket sales is
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increasing. (In 1974 85% of take home beer sales were 
through unlicensed supermarkets, and the biggest chain, 
Albert Heidin, accounted for 50% of these sales). 
U. Advertising and price variation can be very effective in 
urban areas.
5. Foreign penetration is high but so are exports.
6. The market is much smaller (per capita and in total) 
than the UK and has greater growth potential.
The Brewing industry
The Dutch brewing industry is highly concentrated and is 
dominated by Heineken who, since their merger with Amstel 
in 1968, have held around 55% of the domestic beer market. 
Historically the Dutch brewing industry has been very 
concentrated with 6 firm concentration (the combined 
market-share of the 6 biggest brewers) being as high as 85% 
of sales in 1931. In 1981 U firm concentration was over 90% 
of sales as a result of a spate of mergers and takeovers in 
1968/69. In 1968 Allied Breweries (a UK company) took over 
Drie Hoefijzers and Orandeboom to form Skol with a 
market-share of 19.0% making it the Netherland's second 
biggest brewer. In 1969 Heineken acquired Amstel increasing 
their share from 35% to around 55% of the total Dutch beer 
market. This move was probably as a defensive measure 
against the preceding takeover. In the same year Stella 
Artois (a Belgian brewer) bought two small breweries,
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Sommelsche and Schaapskaai. They followed this with the 
takeover of the Hengelosche brewery in 1974 making Artois 
the Netherland's third biggest brewer with around 8.5% of 
the market. This last move reduced imports from Belgium but 
increased foreign penetration. There are eleven other 
brewers in the industry but only three have more than 1% 
market-share; Grolsch, Brand and Bavaria. (See Table 5.4)
Table 5-4
Estimated Market-shares of the leading brewery groups in
the Netherlands, 1973
Group Market-share (per cent)
Heineken 55.0
Skol (Allied) 18.5
Artois 8.5
Grolsch 7.2
Bavaria 6.5
Brand 1.8
Others 2.5
Source: Marketing in Europe
Brouwer (op.cit) analysed concentration and the 
determination of profitability in the Dutch brewing 
industry.
Costs
Like the UK brewing industry, raw material costs are 
roughly the same for all the brewers.. In the Netherlands 
hop prices are volatile as they are mostly imported from 
West Germany.
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The Dutch equivalent to the Brewer's Society the "Centraal 
Brouwerij Kantoor" buys barley centrally for the whole 
industry and sells it to the brewers at a fixed price. As a 
result most brewers also malt their own barley. 
Brouwer(ibid) found that "no cost advantages relating to 
materials and labour are attained by the largest firms" 
Transport costs are of little importance since most Dutch 
brewers operate nationally in a market which is 
geographically small, and served by a good road network. An 
interesting feature is that firm size is not not related 
to plant size with all the major brewers being 
multiple, small plant, users. This has changed to some 
extent with Heineken concentrating production in two rather 
than three breweries since 1981.
Profitability
Little data were available for individual brewers and 
the data available was restricted to the only two public 
companies Heineken and Skol. However the comparisons are 
interesting with Heineken out performing Skol in terms^of 
profitability and thus supporting the PIMS findings on 
market-share. (See table 5-5)
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Table 5-5
Net profit as a percentage of sales for Heineken and Skol
1971-1975
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Heineken
7.7
6.9
5.8
5.1
3.8
Skol
1.6
1.6
2. 0
1.6
1.5
Source: Brouwer 1976
To be fair, Skol had only dust established itself, as 
opposed to Heineken f s long standing position as market 
leader, but it was not until 1983 that Skol started its 
financial recovery. (Allied Lyons Report and Accounts, 
1983) One reason for Heineken's higher profitability could 
be its lower domestic investment, (see Table 5.6) with most 
of its investment concentrating on overseas markets during 
the period. However Grolsch invested considerably more than 
either Heineken or Skol (proportionally) and appeared to 
reap the benefits. During the period 1970-197/1 Grolsch's 
sales increased by 86% as compared to Skol'S 43%. Heineken 
increased sales by 153%t but this includes worldwide sales 
as well.
Table 5-6
Domestic investment as a percentage of sales by Heineken
Skol and Grolsch, 1970-1974.
Heineken
1970
1971
1972
1973
1971
3.
6.
7.
8.
4.
0
0
0
5
8
Skol
6.5
a. 6
9.5
5.4
7.6
Grols
10.
5.
27.
6.
19.
ch
0
3
5
1
7
Source: Brouwer 1976
Table 5-7
Estimated publicity expenditure for selected brands of beer
in the Netherlands 1971-1973 (100O Df 1 )
Brand 1971
Heineken 1706
Amstel 1334
Skol na
Grolsch 1194
Artois na
Brand 23
Source: Brouwer 1976
Advertising expenditure
1972
1841
1292
1149
1242
89
26
1973
1920
654
893
1615
122
28
Advertising statistics were more readily available and are 
show in Table 5«7 From these figures it appears Heineken 
have a much lower A/S ratio which may be because their 
strong brand name does not require as much support. Grolsch 
had a very high A/S ratio and Brouwer(ibid) found that a 
positive relationship exists between increased advertising 
and increased market-share. For example Grolsch has 
increased its advertising budget at the most rapid rate and 
is also the fastest growing of Dutch brewers. It would 
appear that Heineken has required a minimum of marketing 
effort to maintain its position. Brouwer also found that 
the national brands (Heineken, Amstel, Skol and possibly 
Grolsch) are more expensive than regional brands, with 
consumers willing to pay higher prices for well established 
brands.
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Conclusions.
The market conditions and structural determinants of the 
Dutch brewing industry appear to be in line with the PIMS 
belief in the idea of the successful market-leader. 
However, although Skol was having a difficult time for most 
of the 1968-1981 period, the other brewers, in particular 
Grolsch were very successful. Artois success in the 
Netherlands can be verified by the acquisition of their 
third Dutch brewery in 1974 indicating continuing 
expansion. The success of the non-share leaders is contrary 
to the PIMS analysis, although it could be argued that both 
Grolsch and Artois are of a more regional nature and 
therefore are leaders in their "served markets." This 
cannot be verified due to a lack of data.
While the UK brewing industry experienced rapid product 
changes and marketing U-turns, the Dutch brewing industry 
has been far more stable after the spate of takeovers in 
the late 1960s. Such takeovers also took place in the UK 
around the same time but the strength of the market leader 
was much less pronounced. Regional variations in taste, and 
a comparatively large number of beer types ensured that the 
UK brewing industry has remained far more fragmented than 
the Dutch industry. Consequently it is a much more complex 
marketing situation.
Re-investment in the Netherlands, whilst in evidence, was
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not as pronounced as the UK since new lager and Keg beer 
facilities (as opposed to simply increasing capacity) were 
not required by brewers in the Netherlands. The largest 
brewer, Heineken, and the regional brewers have experienced 
reasonable success, while Skol appeared to have suffered 
from being "second place." This kind of scenario reflects 
Porter's suggestion of adopting one or two of the generic 
strategies to maintain high profitability. Heineken have 
adopted differentiation and the regionals (Grolsch in 
particular) have adopted a combination of focussed and cost 
leadership strategies. Skol appear to have failed to adopt 
any of these strategies and have suffered as a consequence.
Overall the Dutch brewing industry has produced a case of 
market-leadership=higher profitability, but certainly not 
to the exclusion of the successful regional brewers. The 
next chapter discusses the US brewing industry and the 
studies carried out on profitability determination.
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CHAPTER SIX: PROFITABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES BREWING
INDUSTRY
Introduction
The United States brewing industry provides some valuable 
comparisons for industry analysis and the application 
of theoretical models. There is also considerably more 
easily accessible data on the US brewing industry than in 
either the UK or the Netherlands. As well as financial 
statements, information was available on market-share for 
individual brewers of each state and national share 
data going back to the 1950s. This information was 
compiled for the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Report (Keithahn, 1978) and has enabled detailed research 
to be carried out into the market-share profitability 
relationship. (Hatten and Hatten, 1982) Studies have also 
analysed why different firms experienced different degrees 
of success, and looked at the determinants of profitability 
within the industry (Hatten and Schendel 1977, Schendel and 
Patton 1978) The models and methods used go some way to 
indicating how one can analyse the UK brewing industry and 
the problems that may be involved.
This chapter will outline the salient features of the US 
brewing industry drawing on the work of Keithahn (op.cit). 
It will then discuss other studies in detail and finally
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suggest the application of some of their (Hatten and 
Schendel f s) tools to analyse the UK brewing industry.
The United States brewing industry
The United States produces a greater volume of beer than 
any other country in the world with an annual output of 
around 180 million hectolitres in 1981. This compares to 
the UK with around 62 million hectolitres and the 
Netherlands with around 16 million hectolitres. Per capita 
consumption is lower than the UK at around 82 litres (per 
capita per year) as compared to 117 litres in the UK and 
73 litres in the Netherlands. (Jackson 1982) There is also 
a very traditional element to the US brewing industry which 
has only recently begun to change. Many of the brewers 
including the market leaders such as Anheuser-Busch, 
Schlitz or Coors are still owned by descendants of the 
German and East European families which founded them in the 
last century.
From the end of World War Two until the late 1950s, the US 
brewing industry experienced a decline in demand coupled 
with an average profitability far below most other US 
industries. This decline and low profitability encouraged 
many brewers to leave the industry. (Keithahn op.cit) Since 
19^5, four and eight firm concentration doubled but firms 
continued to leave the industry even after demand for beer
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started to rise again in the late 1950s. Keithahn cites the 
success of the national brewers as the major reason for the 
continued concentration in the industry (see table 6.1).
Table 6.1
Concentration in the US brewing industry. 1963-1974
Year Number of Companies
1963 150
1967 125
1971 74
1974 58
Source: FTC 1978
After 1959 demand picked up, due not so much to a rise in 
real income, but to a change in tastes from spirits and of 
a relaxation of off-sales restrictions, (ibid)
Structural determinants of profitability
Virtually all US beer ±s of the Pilsner type and slighty 
weaker than its European counter part (a throw back from 
prohibition). The move from darker to lighter beers has 
been almost universal in the USA. In comparision to the UK 
no equivalent movement to CAMRA persuaded the brewers or 
the drinking public to return to the old styles of beer. In 
the USA these darker more flavoursome brews have become a 
small proportion of total beer production with most 
Americans prefering the blander but more thirst quenching 
pilsner type beer.
Thus, as in the Netherlands, the variety of beers has 
become very limited and differentiation has to be created 
by advertising. This has been one of the market leaders 
greatest successes: to persuade consumers, using a national 
campaign, that premium (or high) priced beer equals 
premium quality. In a country where mobility is very high, 
the appeal of finding a "known" brand where ever one 
travels can be reassuring. The ability to sell a single 
brand of beer on a national scale must be instrumental for 
maintaining a profitable national presence by a national 
brewer, market leader or otherwise. (Keithahn, 1978)
The success of the market leaders
The leaders of the US industry, Anheuser-Busch (of 
Budweiser and Michelob fame), Schlitz, Pabst and Miller all 
adopted a very specific strategy of high national brand 
profile and Keithahn stresses that this was one of the 
reasons for the rise of the national brewers. The high 
brand profile was aided in its development by the increase 
in packaged beer. Traditionally the US beer market hars been 
more packaged orientated than the UK or the Netherlands, 
with 66X of beer being packaged even by 19^6. By 1976 this 
had increasesd to around 87X. Since packaged beer has a 
longer shelf life (and is therefore easier to transport 
long distances), and can be sold in all licensed outlets 
rather than dust bars, it was these products that the
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nationals promoted. Schendel and Patton (op.cit) found 
that;
"the national firms have been successful in gaining 
dominance in the market place by presenting a quality 
product and backing it up with intensive marketing 
expenditures and a strong distribution system." (pl6l8)
The strong distributive system was a result of expansion by 
constructing new plant in each new area being developed as 
a market. Expansion by this method rather than acquisition 
of existing plant, was in the long run a more cost 
effective investment. Keithahn (op.cit) identified the 
benefits of technological advancements and the cost savings 
on labour from a minimum plant size for new investment.
New plant strategy and merger control
Construction of new plant also avoided the problem of 
referral to the anti-trust laws which legislate over 
monopoly situations. When the national brewers started to 
expand from single to multi-plant operations the regional 
brewers sought to expand (as a defensive measure) in a less 
costly way by acquiring existing plant or brewers. However 
anti-trust laws severely restricted this development. 
Federal and State policy was in direct contrast to the UK, 
which had encouraged mergers during the sixties. Keithahn 
believed that "if mergers had been allowed the nationals 
might have acquired old small breweries and might have 
grown more slowly than they actually grew."(p5l) it is
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possible that this is what happened in the UK, with the 
national brewers acquiring old ineffective plant and 
closing them down at a high cost, while at the same time 
building new plant, also at considerable cost. The 
difference here is that the UK tied house system makes new 
market penetration much more difficult than in the USA. 
Overall, the blocking of US regional brewers merger 
attempts may have weakened their competitive 
position.(ibid)
As the analysis of the UK brewing industry will show 
high capital investment is not positively correlated with 
high profitability. However the US national brewers have 
been very profitable despite high capital expenditure. 
(Schendel and Patton op.cit) The explanation for some of 
this variance can be explained by the fact that the US 
national brewers embarked on expansion some time before 
those in the UK and the benefits of the investment have 
already been realized. The choice between acquisition or 
new plant is also important in this area (as mentioned 
earlier). Keithahn stated this point very clearly:
"That the national brewers were pursuing a profitable 
strategy was not obvious until the late 1960s. In the 
1950s when the nationals were in the initial stages of 
expansion, competitors were predicting disaster for the 
national brewers due to the poor trend in sales and the 
large amount of debt they were incurring in order to 
expand... thus there was a considerable lag between the 
time national brewers began expansion and the time it 
became obvious that they were doing something right. M pl25
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Advertising
Although Keithahn and Schendel & Patton cite high marketing 
effort as one of the major reasons for the leaders success, 
Anheuser-Busch who experienced the greatest growth, did not 
have the highest average advertising/sales ratio. Keithahn 
considered that advertising's effect was difficult to 
gauge and it depended on other factors. The success of 
Miller "Lite" is an example. Miller were taken over by 
Philip Morris (the tobacco concern) who set about promoting 
a low carbohydrate beer not for slimmers, who were low beer 
drinkers anyway, but for young drinking men who were 
interested in being sporty. Miller "Lite" was successfully 
promoted as a sportsman's beer.
Survival of the small brewers
Despite Keithahn suggesting that being big and national was 
the most advantageous position he also believed that some 
very small brewers would survive due to; local loyalty, 
knowledge of local taste, low transport and advertising 
costs, good labour relations and a special niche in the 
market. In the US small brewers have been protected by the 
anti-trust laws. In the UK these controls are not so 
powerful. There has been a reliance on strong consumer 
pressure (CAMRA), family control of small brewers and some 
protective action by Whitbread, to stop further
68
concentration. What is important is that it is not the high
market-share which is sained that leads to greater
profitability, but in the case of the US brewing industry, 
the method by which this share is acquired. As Rumelt and 
Wensley (1981) pointed out "market-share is not in itself a 
valid strategic goal since it measures success otherwise 
created."p2
Hatten and Schendel*s analysis of the US brewing industry
Hatten and Schendel(op.cit) used the brewing industry as a
laboratory for examining industry structure. They
considered that "size was not the only factor affecting the 
market-structure profitability relationship."(p98) They 
formulated a model to explain inter-firm differences and 
the determination of profitability:
Profitability=f(Market Conduct, Market Structure)
Profitability was measured by return on equity (ROE) and 
the independent variables are shown below:
Manufacturing strategy 
(market conduct)
Marketing strategy 
(market conduct)
Number of plants 
Newness of plants 
Capital intensity
Number of brands 
Price
Debtors/sales ratio 
Firm size
Environment 
(market structure)
Eight firm concentration
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Hatten and Schendel beleived that the influences of market 
conduct and market structure would be different for 
individual brewers as compared to the whole industry. They 
thus saw a need to analyse brewers on an individual basis. 
However this was not possible due to the limited degrees of 
freedom (necessary for meaningful statistical analysis) 
resulting from the limited data base. Because of this 
problem the first stage of the analysis was to group 
similar firms together to increase the degrees of freedom. 
The groups of similar firms would be based on similarity 
between the combined influence of the variables on 
profitability, for each brewer.
Hatten and Schendel's results
Once the firms had been grouped together, the results 
showed that the market conduct and market environment 
variables did affect the profitability of groups of brewers 
in different ways:
1. The number of brands was highly significant and negative 
at the industry level but varying from significantly 
negative through to significantly positive at the group 
level. Thus the positive group, headed by Heileman, 
showed that the number of brands can be an effective 
determinant of profitability.
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2. The number of plants is insignificant at the industry 
level. However for one group (Associated & Falstaff) it 
is positive and significant but for another (Iroquois & 
Lucky) it is very negative and significant. The 
researchers suggest that these companies, each of which 
were suffering a declining market-share, were utilizing 
their plant to different degrees.
3. The price is not significant at the industry level and 
in each group its effect is negative except for Iroquois 
& lucky. These small local brewers may have a loyal 
following of drinkers willing to pay a premium for their 
beer.
4. The debtors/ sales ratio is negative and significant at 
the industry level, but moderately significant for only 
two groups (Anheuser-Busch & Schlitz and 
Associated & Falstaff). Hatten and Schendel suggest that 
the larger brewers have been expanding via extended 
credit to their distribution outlets. However they do 
not suggest why for Associated and Falstaff the debtors/ 
sales ratio is negative and yet they are still not large 
firms in the industry.
Like Keithahn (op.cit) they found that the larger 
firms, through high investment, have been more successful. 
The small firms have tried expansion with varying degrees 
of success. They conclude that;
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"relative success... depends on the conduct of the 
firms, on the coherence of their competitive decisions, 
and on the consistency of those decisions with the 
resources available to the firms involved."p!09
In the second stage Hatten and Schendel wished to test the 
assumption that the data were homogeneous across time. They 
selected two points in time, 1958 and 1964. The reason for 
these particular cut off points were that, "in 1958. the 
two largest brewers, Anheuser-Busch and Schlitz began a new 
period of growth after a relative decline which began in 
the early 1950s. In 1964, after a period of almost frantic 
competitive activity, the industry f s advertising 
expediture per barrel began to decline. ff p!09 (ibid) 
Between these two points in time some variables for some 
groups did change in significance. Interestingly newness of 
plant changed from being significant to insignificant for 
the market leaders, Anheuser-Busch and Schlitz. The 
advantages of early expansion had clearly been gained 
before the other brewers.
Hatten and Schendel provide a useful framework with which 
to analyse the effect of variables on profitability of 
groups of firms. Importantly they state that;
"unless the homogeneity assumption is challenged in any 
study employing pooled cross-sectional and time series 
data, there must be doubts as to the reliability of 
the reported estimates."pllO
Hatten and Schendel bring together a number of important
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conclusions of relevance to any similar study that might be 
undertaken.
Hatten and Schendel's conclusions
1. The emphasis on homogeneity forces the use of more 
similar or "like" data. Due to this similarity 
generalisations from the results can be reduced.
2. The method reduces the degrees of freedom and thus the 
number of variables must be reduced and hence be highly 
selective. This may weaken the model. The model can be 
strengthened by use of "judgement" but this method of 
grouping will be subjective.
3. A unique model for each strategic group would be a more 
useful representation of the conduct of groups. However 
if one firm is not similar to any other firms the 
limited degrees of freedom will exclude it from any 
significant statistical analysis.
Structural variables may not vary either over time or 
from firm to firm. eg concentration. Without any 
variance statistical analysis is not possible.
Much of this work will be applied to the UK and will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 13.
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Schendel and Patton's analysis of the US brewing industry
Schendel and Patton (op.cit) build on Hatten and Schendel's 
work by examining the effects of controllable and
non-controllable variables on three measures of
performance. The variables and measures of performance are 
shown in table 6.2.
Table 6.2
Schendel and Patton*s brewing industry variables, 1978
Non-controllable 
variables
Concentration 
Industry advertising 
Industry material costs 
Industry wage rate 
Number of brewers 
Per capita consumption 
Per cent package sales
Performance variables
Profitability 
Market-share 
Efficiency
Controllable 
variables
Acquisition
Advertising
Average capacity
Capacity utilization
Capital expenditures
Capital intensity
Capital to labour
Debt
Length of production cycle
Material costs
Newness of plants
Number of brands
Number of plants
Price per barrel
Receivables to sales
Size
Like Hatten and Schendel they were very keen to ensure 
homogenenity within groups and adopted the same statistical 
grouping method. They hypothesised three groups of firms;
small regional, large regional and national. The
homogeneity testing procedure confirmed these groups.
This coincidence might lead one to believe that groups 
could be identified without recourse to the complicated and 
statistically difficult methods employed. A good knowledge 
of the industry under study may be sufficient for initial 
identification of strategic groups. Analysis of an industry 
in the way suggested by Porter, for example, may be a more 
effective and flexible approach than the Hatten and 
Schendel grouping procedure. Having said this the 
identification of groups within an industry is important 
and it may be encouraging to know that the statistical 
grouping method produces the same results as the 
hypothesised groups. Patton & Schendel (op.cit) pointed out 
the advantages of this in their conclusions by stating 
that:
"Qualitative investigation of the sample under 
consideration is necessary to identify the relevant sets 
of performance measures, managerially controllable, and 
non-controllable factors used to specify the model. With 
a proper background study and model specification the 
benefits of explicit mathematical modelling can be more 
fully realized." pl620
Schendel and Patton found that results for each subgroup 
were substantially different from the industry level 
results. A significant result was the relationship 
between market-share and profitability (measured by ROE). 
At the industry level increasing market-share was found to 
have a significant positive effect on profitability. 
However for each sub group it was found to be negative. 
This qualified their belief that industry-level results are
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misleading. They explain the factors that have most 
influenced the three strategic groups. Many of the findings 
are similar to Keithahn's and are described only briefly.
National firms
These firms benefited from;
a. a high quality product backed up with intensive 
marketing expenditures and a strong distribution system,
b. an initial trade off of profitability for market-share 
but only in the short run (5 to 10 years).
c. and a successful multiple plant strategy utilizing new, 
rather than acquired, plant and machinery.
All this eventually provided cash resources for a 
continuing heavy marketing effort.
Large regional firms
These firms have been in direct competition with the 
expanding nationals and have had to indulge in a costly 
battle to maintain market-share. Concentration and the 
trend favouring packaged beer has had a strong negative 
effect, with the national expanding through packaged beers. 
(Packaged beers are easier to transport, and hence easier 
to distribute to new areas). Another problem the large
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regionals have faced is too many brands without the 
necessary advertising support. The effect of advertising 
for the regional firms is much weaker than for the 
national firms.
Small regional firms.
These firms attempted a multiple brand strategy and found 
that it has a strong negative effect on profitability. 
Those firms who began a multiple plant strategy (by 
acquiring existing plant) initially found that 
profitability and market-share increase significantly. 
However this growth was not sustained and the relationship 
soon became negative. Overall these firms "did not possess 
the resources and expertise necessary to sustain a larger 
operation. Mpl6l9 Schendel and Patton concluded that as a 
rule "if you do not have the necessary resources for a 
market-share fight, do not start one. Mpl6l9 However they 
do identify a number of large regional firms who have been 
more profitable than the nationals. These firms have 
achieved this by adopting a multiple brand, rather than a 
multiple plant, strategy and by concentrating in specific 
geographical segments.
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Hatten and Hatten*s analysis of the US brewing industry
This most recent work on the US brewing industry 
concentrates on three Issues:
1. The robustness of the market-share profit relationship 
within the industry.
2. The information content of some alternate market 
definitions.
3. The nature and stability of industry structure.
This emphasis on the market-share issue is a departure from 
the previous studies which had looked at the more general 
determinants of profitability. It addresses the question 
"what is market-share?" and offers some guidelines for 
industry analysis by strategic marketeers. Hatten and 
Hatten (op.cit) felt that although aggregated measures of 
market-share can be misleading, market-share "can become a 
major aid for self-diagnosis and strategy improvement."p9 
(ibid) In addressing the market-share profitability 
relationship they suggest that managers should take less 
notice of share and profitability (ROI) and more notice of 
actual profit margins. Profitability can be maintained by 
underinvestment. Anticipation of the future market is thus 
of considerable importance if firms are to be successful in 
the long run.
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The first stage
Hatten and Hatten were able to use the FTC data which 
provided a much richer data base than the previous two 
studies. They started by analysing the correlation between 
five profitability measures and seven market-share 
definitions. They grouped the firms once again using Hatten 
and Schendel's grouping process. They found that share of 
the industry's profit was not necessarily related to 
profitability. They suggest that it is more important to 
achieve a disproportionate share of the industry's 
profits rather than to achieve higher profitability. They 
also found that those brewers who dominate the national 
market are not dominant in the regional markets. However 
hegemony in regional markets produces a low correlation 
with profitability suggesting that regional market 
dominance is not sufficient for sustained profitability. 
They identified the large regionals Olympia and Heileman 
(found to be very profitable by Schendel and Patton) to be 
vunerable to competition due to a low share of the 
industry's profit, despite a high regional share and high 
profitability. Olympia and Heileman may be caught in 
regions in which they do not have the resources to break 
out. nor the resources to stop the national brewers moving 
in.
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The second stage
The second stage examined the impact of market-share 
strategy on profitability when the effects of the major 
marketing variables were controlled. These are Product 
(number of brands). Price (revenue/barrels). Promotion 
(advertising expenditure) and Place (number of plants per 
state). They found that:
1. "There appear to be substantial differences in the 
impacts of marketing variables on profitability between 
groups, and their combined impact is not particularly 
high;"
2. "The market share effect appears to be difficult to 
establish and probably varies across the brewing 
industry;"
3. "National market-share is very likely a proxy for many 
corporate resources and decisions". p/iO
However market-share may be defined in a number of ways 
and the use of "national share" only could be 
misleading.
"In the brewing industry, the structure of competition 
may be primarily regional. If so, it is a competition of 
national brewers against regionals isolated in their 
once safe niches."
Since the earlier studies the brewing industry has 
restructured. Anheuser-Busch has pulled away from the rest 
of the industry earning a disproportinate share of the 
industry profits especially during the 1970s. Miller has 
overtaken Schlitz as the number two brewer due to its heavy
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advertising campaign. Hatten and Hatten suggest that 
marketing efficiency has, more than anything else, made 
Anheuser-Busch so successful.
Like the previous studies, Hatten and Hatten have 
identified the market leaders and the direction the brewing 
industry appears to be going. However they paint a gloomy 
picture of the future of many of the other brewers, even 
those which have been successful in recent years, eg 
Heileman.
Hatten and Hatten conclude with a number of guidelines for 
strategic analysis:
1. The market-share profitability relationship should be 
tested to determine whether it really is applicable to a 
particular competitive situation. This finding 
echoes Woo (1984) and Porter (1982) in their criticism 
of the aggregated data of PIMS.
2. "Market is a working hypothesis and good strategic 
marketing necessitates a wide choice of market options. 
These options should be developed through consideration 
of not only customers, but competitors' strategies and 
the firms internal capabilities." p50
3. In analysing competitors, marketing managers must 
exhaustively analyse those firms they are competing
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with, especially those competing in the same way; their 
experiences may be relevant. Points 2 and 3 are similar 
to Porter's (op.cit) recommendations on analysing 
competitive situations.
Profitable niches can be non-growth traps when an 
industry restructures so it is important to monitor 
competitors' profit and growth rates, as well as changes 
in market-share.
These conclusions support Porter (ibid) in that an overall 
analysis of structural and competitive determinants of an 
industry must be examined, pointing out that knowledge 
about the industry in which you compete is paramount. The 
most significant finding is the belief that profit rather 
than profitability is the most important measure of 
success. Hatten and Hatten empirically monitored the 
decline of the very profitable regional brewers while the 
not so profitable nationals were absorbing the market. The 
implication is that market power will eventually control an 
industry, and as a logical conclusion, create a monopoly 
situation. This is a depressing scenario for all but the 
biggest US brewers, but with Anheuser-Busch earning around 
60% of the industry profits (ibid) it is rapidly becoming a 
reality. The ability of the regionals to respond by 
amalgamation is hampered by the anti trust laws. (Business 
Week 1982)
82
Survival of non-market leaders depends on how well they can 
assert themselves as viable competitors with sufficiently 
differentiated or focused products. This is still the case 
in the Netherlands and, as will be explained in the next 
chapter, certainly the case in the UK.
Application of methods
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter the 
methods developed by these US studies provide a valuable 
framework for analysing the UK brewing industry. The 
application of these methods will be looked at more 
closely in sections 4 and 5« However some of the important 
aspects are set out below:
1. Industry aggregates may cover up intra industry 
differences. There is therefore a need for a method to 
place firms into similar or homogeneous groups.
2. Purely statistical grouping methods cannot be relied on, 
and a strong element of qualitative analysis must be 
employed. Therefore a good knowledge of the industry to 
be analysed is paramount to be able to explain the 
results fully.
3. Profitability and market-share are ambiguous and can 
be measured in a number of different ways. Hence they 
should be treated with caution when analysed.
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Industry structure is a dynamic process and is 
constantly changing over time; this must be taken into 
account.
The next chapter discusses the UK brewing industry and the 
studies carried out on profitability determination.
CHAPTER SEVEN; PROFITABILITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM BREWING
INDUSTRY
Introduction
This chapter describes some of the salient features of the 
UK brewing industry, the changes that have taken place over 
the past twenty years, and the type of industry that has 
emerged. It discusses studies that have looked at the 
issues of profitability determination in the UK brewing 
industry over the past ten years, and in reference to the 
US and Dutch experience. Utilizing knowledge of the 
industry, it will finally point to how analysis of the 
determination of profitability can be carried out.
Development of the market
The UK brewing industry is currently the fourth largest in 
the world and produced 36.7 million barrels in 1984. 
Production peaked in 1979. after around twenty years of 
continuous growth, and since then has been slowly 
declining. From 1959 to 1972 the UK brewing industry under 
went a rapid period of concentration as did both the US and 
Dutch brewing industries. This resulted in over 70% of UK 
beer being produced by the six largest brewers by 1970, as 
compared to 25* in 1950 (see table 7.1).
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Table 7.1 Number of UK breweries and brewery companies. 
19UO-1983
1940 1950 I960 1970 1980 1983
Breweries (a) 840 567 358 177 142 130 
Brewery companies (b) n.a n.a 247 96 81 78
(a) A brewery is defined as a site where beer is brewed and 
excise duty is paid on it.
(b) A brewery company is defined as a company actively 
brewing.
Source: Key Note: Breweries, 1984
Before the early 1960s the UK brewing industry had been 
predominantly regional although a few brands, most notably 
Worthington and Guinness, had achieved national status. The 
mergers and takeovers that took place during the 1960s were 
partly to secure continued trade, (by acquiring tied 
outlets) and partly to derive improved economies of scale 
from greater size. This concentration did not leave any 
distinct market leader and no single brewer has ever held 
more than 20% market-share.
Since 1972, the UK brewing industry has been dominated by 
the six national brewers and Guinness, (who are an 
exception in that they own no pubs). The market-share of 
these brewers is shown in table 7.2. It is noticeable that 
some brewers have concentrated on the on-licensed sector 
and some on the off-licensed sector.
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Table 7.2 
Market-shares of major UK brewers in the off and on
licensed trades in 1982; by percentage of volume sales
On-licensed
Bass
Allied
Scottish and Newcastle
Grand Metropolitan
Whitbread
Courage
Guinness
Others
Total
21.
14.
12.
11.
11.
9.
3.
17.
100.
0
5
0
5
5
0
5
0
0
Off-licensed Total
14.
11.
18.
12.
11.
9.
10.
13.
100.
0
5
5
0
5
0
0
5
0
20.
14.
12.
11.
11.
9.
6.
15.
100.
0
0
5
5
5
0
0
5
0
Note: Include factored and imported beers 
Source: EIU and trade estimates
Distribution
An important feature of the UK brewing industry is the high 
proportion of brewery owned licensed premises, (see table 
7-3) The brewers* products will be almost exclusive to that 
outlet.
Table 7.3
Brewers ownership of licensed premises in the UK as
percentage of
On-licence
Off-licence
the total, 1977-1979
1977
68. 1
12. 5
1978
66.6
11. 4
1979
65. 3
11. 3
Total 34.3 32.9 32. 0
(in 1978 the "Big Six" owned 51X of all licensed premises.) 
Source: Brewers' society
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A merger or acquisition of another brewer will result in, 
not dust greater production capacity, but also greater 
distribution through the acquired brewers' pubs and 
off-licenses. Larger scale entry by new companies (other 
than takeover) into the brewing industry can only be 
effective if the consent of one of the major brewers is 
given in the form of a licensing or distribution agreement. 
Like the Netherlands the loan system is also heavily in 
evidence. (See table 7.5)
Product differentiation and development
A major change that has taken place over the past twenty 
years has been in consumer tastes. The most dramatic change 
has been the rise in demand for lager, from Just 8.6% of 
the market (in volume) in 1972 to 18% by 1976 and around 
110% in 198/1. UK lager is the equivalent to Dutch Pils or US 
standard beer but often sold at a price higher than the 
equivalent strength bitter, the other major UK beer type, 
with around H5% of draught beer sales. Despite the 
predominance of bitter and lager the UK has a very wide 
range of beer types, and certainly far more variety than 
either the US or Dutch markets. Stout accounts for around 
6% of the market (almost exclusively sold by Guinness) with 
Mild declining, but still with 7% of the market, being the 
fourth major beer sector.
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Lager has been the one major growth sector in the UK beer 
market and as consequence the national brewers have 
invested heavily in production facilities for, and in the 
promotion of, the product. This expenditure has been seen 
by some observers as, at best, unnecessary and at worst, 
creating a demand that did not previously exist. (CAMRA 
1981) The logic of high investment will be explained later, 
suffice to say that it was the nationals that spent most on 
new plant and machinery during a period which saw sustained 
growth in demand. Lager has continued to rise in popularity 
even though the overall beer market has declined since 
1979- As can be seen from table 7. 4 advertising expenditure 
has certainly been directed towards this segment, with the 
notable exception of Guinness.
Table 7.4
UK TV and press advertising expenditure on beer in 1983 by
the top 10 advertisers. ( £000 )
Brand
Guinness (Guinness)
Carling Black Label (Bass)
Heineken (Whitbread)
Carlsberg (Carlsberg and Watneys)
Skol (Allied)
Fosters (Watneys)
Harp (Harp and Guinness)
Hofmeister (Courage)
Kestrel (Scottish and Newcastle)
Best (Whitbread)
Product
Stout
Lager
Lager
Lager
Lager
Lager
Lager
Lager
Lager
Bitter
£000
9532
6325
4162
3904
3481
3121
3065
2760
2425
2237
Total advertising expenditure 79541
Source: MEAL
Another factor that has played an important role in the UK
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brewing industry has been the development of keg beer. Kes 
beer was marketed in the 1960s and 1970s on a very large 
scale to replace cask conditioned or "Real" ale. Keg beer 
is a product of consistent quality with a longer shelf life 
and is thus easier to sell nationally. However many 
beer drinkers found that keg beer was bland and generally 
more expensive than cask conditioned ale. This 
dissatisfaction, combined with a dislike for the demise of 
regional beers (due to takeovers) led to the very 
successful consumer movement, CAMRA (Campaign for real 
ale). What CAMRA succeeded in achieving was the 
re-introduction of "real ale" to the majority of pubs in 
under 10 years, this being combined with a return to more 
regional variation in products from the national brewers.
This apparent U-turn by the national brewers was not 
entirely due to consumer pressure and CAMRA. One of the 
major reasons was the considerable success the regional 
brewers experienced. Most of these brewers had never 
attempted to switch to keg beers due to a strong sense of 
tradition and the high cost of switching production. The 
advantages of keg beer's stability were not so important as 
distribution was only over a limited geographical area. The 
regional brewers benefited from a strong local loyalty for 
their products, whereas the national brewers had to 
maintain loyalty by high advertising expenditure and 
promotion. The end result was lower costs for the regional 
brewers due to low distribution, administration and
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promotion costs which enabled them to charge hence lower 
prices. (Price Commission 1977)
The success of "Real Ale" and the local image of the 
regional brewers persuaded the nationals to concentrate on 
a regional image of their brands and a partial return to 
cask conditioned beer. This reversal was significantly 
different to that of the US or the Dutch brewing 
industry. However this regional policy on the part of the 
large brewers does not disguise the fact that over Q0%' of 
the industry is still controlled by the "Big six" brewers.
Another important difference between the UK and the US and 
Dutch brewing industries is the predominance of draught, 
rather than packaged beer. Only around 20% of beer is sold 
in packaged form in the UK although it had been increasing 
steadily over the past ten years. Although the UK market is 
much smaller than the USA market the expense of 
transporting draught beer is high and unless the 
distribution system is very efficient, prices will reflect 
this (as noted above). Packaged beer is mostly sold as 
take home through off-licences, and this sector is much 
smaller in the UK than in the US or the Netherlands.
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The proportion of draught beer consumed in on-licensed 
premises owned by the brewer had meant that the pub itself 
is as important a product as the drink it sells. This 
importance had been increasingly capitalized on in 
recent years with a shift in investment from plant and 
machinery to the licensed estate (mainly pubs). (See table 
7.5)
Table 7.5
Net fixed investments in the UK brewing industry.
1976-198/1.
Production
Retailing
Free trade
Other
£ million
and distribution
loans
1976
113
51
17
23
1979
161
79
22
35
1984
135
501
n. a
n. a
Total 2OU 307 1503 
Source: Brewer's Society
The ownership of pubs and off-licences ensures a guaranteed 
market for most of the brewers. Another reason for the 
shift of resources was the enormous over capacity which has 
existed since the mid 1970s. At present this stands at 
around 16 million barrels, with total production around 38 
million barrels. (Food manufacture 1984-)
Competition
Competition takes place in two sectors, indirectly through 
investment in pubs and directly through the much smaller,
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but rapidly expanding free trade, especially the 
off-licenses. As mentioned earlier the brewers compete for 
the free on-trade by use of loans, hence the predominance 
of nationals in this sector (due to greater financial 
resources) (CAMRA op.cit). To some extent this has also 
been the case in the free off-trade. However with the 
relaxation of the licensing laws, multiple grocers (mainly 
supermarkets) have captured a large and increasing share of 
the retail beer trade. This has forced the brewers to 
compete heavily in terms of price, and to a lesser degree, 
differentiation and focusing
The much stronger competition in the free trade has led to 
a high price discrepancy between the on and off-trades. 
Pubs will charge whatever the market will tolerate (Price 
Commission op.cit) where as in the free off-trade, 
especially supermarkets, the price is very much related to 
price of the product on the shelf next to it. Some brewers 
have managed to produce sufficiently differentiated 
products to sustain higher prices (eg Greene King) but the 
bulk of the market is highly competitive.
Acquisition and diversification
Other than expansion through competition and product 
differentiation, the UK brewers have opted for two basic 
strategies of acquisition and diversification. Unlike the
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USA. the UK anti-trust laws have been more lenient and 
mergers and acquisitions were, as mentioned above, very 
common until 1972. Since then opposition to this type of 
activity has been stronger and only the smaller brewers 
have been able to expand in this way without referral to 
the Monopolies Commission. The larger brewers have in many 
cases opted for diversification away from brewing.
Diversification has not always been that successful since 
many ventures have had little to do with brewing; as a 
consequence expertise in the new areas has often 
been lacking. A good example of this was Guinness 
with interests in plastics, oyster fishing and 
conf ectionary , all of which were sold soon after the 
appointment of a new chairman in 198O. The most successful 
diversifications have been in more related operations such 
as hotels, catering and wines and spirits. (Sawyer 1983) 
Even in this field results have not been as good as the 
brewing divisions. In 1984 Bass derived 25X of its revenues 
from leisure activities (ie betting, holidays, hotels etc) 
but only 14* of its profits. (The Economist, 1985)
The excessive increase in beer prices since 1979t mainly 
attributable to high tax increases had, along with high 
unemployment, contributed to a reduction in demand. On top 
of this, tax on wine was considerably reduced in 198/1 
making it far more competitive with beer.
The important features that have shaped profitability 
over the past 15 years in the UK brewing industry are 
summarized below.
1. A rapid phase of concentration accompanied by a steady 
increase in demand over the period; This left seven 
brewers to dominate the market, but with no one brewer 
having more than around 20X of the market. The market 
growth turned into a decline after 1979-
2. A very high proportion of licensed outlets are owned by 
the brewers, making market penetration difficult. The 
power of the brewers has declined with the growth of 
independent licensed grocers.
3. The UK has a wide diversity of beer types.
4. There 'has been a phenomenal rise in the demand for lager 
beer since the late 1960s.
5. Strong consumer reaction to national brand, keg beer 
caused a partial return to traditional beer and a more 
regionalized marketing approach by the national brewers.
6. UK beer is predominantly sold in draught rather than 
packaged form.
7. Investment has swung from plant and machinery to the
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brewer's tied estate, ie pubs.
8. Competition is very fierce especially with nationally 
marketed products in the free off-licence trade.
9. Many larger brewers have attempted to reduce their 
reliance on this competitive and declining industry by 
diversifying into other businesses.
One further point is the high degree of regional 
concentration even by the national brewers, ie Scottish and 
Newcastle's concentration in Scotland and the North East. 
This is similar to the US and Dutch experience, despite 
concentration in all three industries in recent years.
Profitability studies on the United Kingdom brewing 
industry
The most important study carried out on profitability in 
the UK brewing industry and its profitability was the Price 
Commission report (1977) which identified a generally 
negative relationship between market-share and 
profitability. In the same year the NEDC (1977) produced a 
paper which listed the problems facing the UK brewers but 
went on to explain that the small regional brewers still 
had been very successful. The NEDC noted that the financial 
position of the industry had deteriorated as result of
96
inflation and price controls. They felt that new investment 
to meet the demand for lager would be successful only if 
the government held down excise duty. They also identified 
problems with the distribution system which was inefficient 
with under-utilization of delivery vehicles. Industrial 
relations were also a problem resulting in the closure of 
Allied's brewery in Birmingham and Whitbread's brewery in 
Luton. In contrast the NEDC stated that the smaller brewers 
have:
"flourished in the 1970s. Many have been able to 
increase sales at a faster rate than the national 
average and produce satisfactory profits even where 
their prices have been pitched rather lower than the 
average,and this partly due to their special ability to 
contain costs, particularly distribution." p20
This apparent dichotomy in the brewing industry is backed 
up by substantial evidence in the Price Commission's 
report, (op.cit)
The Price Commission was called to investigate: 
a. the high price of beer 
b. the frequency of price increases
c. the coincidence of price increases with announcements 
of higher profits by the brewers.
This study pre-empted the US studies (eg Hatten and 
Schendel op.cit) in dividing the brewers into similar 
groups, this time along divisions based on geographical 
distribution areas. They looked at the period 197^-1977 and 
used a sample of the six large brewers, the six regional
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brewers, the three specialist brewers and 12 of the 69 
small brewers. The specialist brewers only brew lager or 
stout and do not own any licensed outlets. Although the 
sample of brewers is wide the number of years covered is 
small and can show little in the way of trend development 
or the outcome of any long term investments. What the 
report is really analysing is the state of profitability 
and the industry structure at one particular point in time. 
Having said this it does illustrate the advantages of 
dividing the UK brewers into strategic groups and shows 
clearly the differences between them.
Prices
It was found that "although prices of small brewers were 
roughly similar to those of large brewers in 1974t by 1977 
they were lower for their main products; bitter, mild and 
pale ale. Thus, the rate of price increase is higher for 
large brewers than for regional and small brewers. tfp9 
Small brewers sold lager at a higher price but this was 
mainly because they bought in most of it from large 
brewers.
Prices in the pubs were set according to; 
a. brewer's policy (if managed) 
b. local competition 
c. profit targets
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Costs
The difference in cost of materials was insignificant 
between the brewers, although it was slightly less for the 
large brewers. However the large brewers spent more on 
selling, marketing, distribution and other overheads than 
the small and regional brewers. "Higher production and 
packaging costs of larger brewers appear to be partly due 
to the greater proportion of their production that they 
package in cans and bottles."p!2(ibid) Any relationship 
between costs and prices appeared to be lacking and the 
Price Commission found that the brewers charged according 
to what they felt the customers were prepared to pay. The 
Price Commission (ibid) found that profits were larger for 
the smaller brewerj and were greater for brewing and 
wholesaling than profits in the tied estate. There 
appeared to be a negative correlation between increased 
number of pubs and off-licences, and profits. Since the 
larger the brewer the greater the tied estate (generally), 
one can conclude that share of profits are not related to 
market-share in the UK.
Return on capital employed
One of the major problems the Price Commission found in 
measuring the profitability of UK brewers was the 
distinction between assets held in plant and machinery etc
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and those held in tied estate. This issue will be examined 
closely in chapter 10, suffice to say that around 60% of 
the capital employed in the brewer's activities as a whole 
are in tied estate, and despite differing valuations of 
this property between brewers, tied estate cannot be 
excluded from a profitability analysis. The Price 
Commission found a sharp discrepancy between profitability 
(profit as a percentage of capital employed) for brewing 
and wholesaling, and for tied estate and loans to free 
trade customers. On top of this a strongly negative 
correlation between profitability and the size of the 
brewer was also identified (see table 7.6).
Table 7.6
Profit as a percentage of capital employed in the UK
brewing industry, 1974-1976.
197U 1975 1976
Large brewers: Brewing and wholesaling 29 3O 32
Tied estate and loans /I 33
Regional brewers: Brewing and wholesaling * * 46
Tied estate and loans * * 3
Small brewers: Brewing and wholesaling * * 53
Tied estate and loans * * 3
Specialist
brewers: Brewing 14 15 ll
Source: Price Commission 1977
Although the data were limited the results do suggest that 
the smaller the brewer the higher the profitability on 
brewing and wholesaling. The profitability on tied estate
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and loans is around the same for all sizes of brewer. It 
may be argued that these figures show the large brewers in 
a poor light simply because the advantages of the mergers 
and investment of previous years have yet to show, (ibid) 
The high discrepancy between brewing and tied estate is 
according to the Brewer's Society (1977) an unfair 
comparison since investment in the tied estate and loans to 
the free trade are only part of the investment strategy.
Investment
The Price Commission found;
"that the large brewers have derived no apparent 
advantage from larger-scale more concentrated 
operations. Their cost and prices are higher and their 
percentage profit margins lower than those of the 
regional and small brewers... this casts doubts on how 
efficient the investment has been. ftp24 (ibid)
The brewers replied by claiming the investment would prove 
worthwhile when exports of UK lager take place. (This has 
yet to become a reality.) The brewers also stated that 
constraint on price increases would stifle investment 
plans, (ibid)
Critisism of the Price Commission report
Keithahn. (op.cit, discussed in the previous chapter) when 
talking about the US brewing industry, suggested that
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it may be some time before investment shows its worth to 
industry observers. The following comments by Colin 
Humphreys (The Times 198/1) go some way to substantiating 
this observation. Humphreys states that the regionals 
due to their reluctance in the 1970s to spend heavily on 
lager and its promotion have found that;
"their brands do not sell well in the free trade against 
nationally advertised names. They are dependent on the 
declining ales sector... and catching up and competing 
with the nationals with their greater resources will be 
hard."
Hawkins (1979) adds that the Price Commission is correct in 
saying that the advantages of acquisition, large scale 
production and national distribution are yet to be seen. 
However he suggests that the Price Commission fails to 
understand the time it takes for firms to recover from 
"post merger re-adjustment problems. M p292 (Hawkins op.cit)
Hawkins also severely criticises the Price Commission for 
failing to grasp that,
"the traditional focus of competition in the on-trade 
(pubs)... derives essentially from the character of the 
retailing operation itself."p228
The Erroll Report (1972) suggested that;
"most pub customers were more influenced in their choice 
of pub by the opportunities for relaxation, social 
intercourse and the standard of amenities provided, 
rather than the brands of liquid on offer and the 
prices at which they are sold."pp59-60
This points out that brewers are not Just in the business 
of selling beer, but also in the leisure business selling a 
product, "the Pub" which as an investment is very difficult
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to assess. Hawkins also pointed out that different rates 
of property valuation make the comparative results for 
return on capital employed meaningless. Concluding that "as 
long as different firms revalue at different times, it will 
always be dangerous to draw conclusions about comparative 
rates of efficiency."
Hawkins criticised the Price Commission in its attempt to 
equate horizontal and vertical integration. He pointed out 
that the Price Commission considered the tied trade 
(vertical integration) to be detrimental to competition if 
owned by the large brewers. However they also considered 
that small firms, whose sales were still heavily dependent 
on their tied houses, were those who made most efficient 
use of their assets. However Hawkins does not take into 
account that the larger brewers were charging higher prices 
in their pubs and using regional monopoly situations to 
sustain these prices. (CAMRA 1981) A recent prices survey 
(Whats Brewing 1985) considered that the large number of 
small breweries in the north west of England has kept 
prices down compared to the rest of the country, due to the 
intensity of competition in the area.
Summary
The general determination of profitability debate in the UK 
brewing industry appears to revolve around the following
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points:
1. The role of the tied outlet is difficult to assess in 
terras of return on investment, not least because of 
differing methods of accounting.
2. The role of the tied outlet cannot be ignored as it has 
a dominant position in the beer market.
3- The tied trade has ensured decreased price competition 
but this has not resulted in high profitability for any 
brewer.
The larger brewers have invested heavily in new plant 
and machinery especially for lager and packaged beer. 
The benefits of this investment may only just be 
beginning to be reaped.
5. The larger brewers have been less profitable than the 
regional or small brewers due to the differences in 
marketing, distribution and other overhead costs.
It is worth noting that:
*The Price Commission has used very limited data and the 
negative correlation between market-share and 
profitability found must be treated with caution.
"'Price competition in the tied trade is relatively weak, 
but in the take home trade it is relatively strong.
*Unlike the US or Dutch brewing industry the UK brewers 
have considerable interests outside brewing.
These observations show that the UK brewing industry is 
very complex and any analysis of profitability 
determination will have to take these problems into 
account.
The suggestion by the Price Commission (op.cit) that the 
large brewers have not been as profitable as the smaller 
brewers is not denied by Hawkins, (op.cit) but that it is 
only a short term situation. Some recent analysts have 
suggested that their investments may be starting to pay 
off. (The Times op.cit) The analysis that is discussed in 
the following chapters will look at profitabilty 
determination in the UK brewing industry, utilizing the US 
methodologies but accounting for the complex problems 
related to the UK industry that have been discussed in this 
chapter.
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SECTION FOUR: RESEARCH METHOD
CHAPTER 8: SAMPLE SELECTION
Introduction
The previous three chapters explained what factors have 
determined profitability in the Dutch, US and UK brewing 
industries, and gave some indication as to how analysis 
might be successfully carried out.
This section describes the analysis adopted to identify 
profit determination for strategic groups of UK brewing 
companies. The first two chapters describe the selection 
of the sample, the analysis undertaken and the selection 
of the variables. The second two chapters explain the 
measurement of the variables and the collection of the 
data.
SAMPLE SELECTION
In this analysis of the UK brewing industry, data
limitations and changes in industry structure proved
to be barriers to the nature and scope of the sample.
The sample included 15 UK brewing companies representing a 
cross section of brewers. The sample included five of
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the six national brewers, one specialist brewer, (Guinness) 
and a nine major and minor regional brewers. Between them, 
these 15 brewers produce over 90% of UK beer production and 
can effectively be considered as the backbone of the 
industry. (See table 8.8) Unfortunately Watney, Mann & 
Truman (the UK's third largest brewer) could not be 
included in the analysis since no disaggregated data from 
their parent company, Grand Metropolitan, were available.
Table 8.1
List of brewing companies in the analysis.
Company Previous name or Average market
parent company share, 1972-82
since 1972 % volume
Bass
Allied Lyons
Whitbread
Scottish and Newcastle
Courage
Bass Charrington 
Allied Breweries
A division of 
Imperial group
Arthur Guinness and Sons
Greenall Whitley
Wolverhampton <-& Dudley
Greene King and Son
Marston,Thompson & Evershed
Vaux Breweries
Matthew Brown
Daniel Thwaites
Boddingtons
Young and Co *s
20. 0 
15-5 
12. 8 
10. 5 
9-3
6.9
2.5
1. 1
0. 82
0. 55
1.6
0. 45
0. 52
0. 43
0. 41
Approximate total 83.4
Source: Trade estimates
Table 8.8 lists the brewers analysed, the first five are 
the national brewers, followed by Guinness and the regional 
brewers. NB: The terms "national" and "regional" were 
derived from a consensus of opinion from the brewing
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industry and its observers. The analysis looks closely 
into the exact definition of these terms in chapter 15.
It would have been preferable to have included one or two 
mini or pub breweries, but data was very limited for these 
operations, not least because they have, in the main, been 
in existence for less than five years. Inclusion of more 
brewers, especially relatively large ones like Harp and 
Carlsberg may have helped the grouping process, as it would 
have increased the chances of more firms being similar. 
However a large number of brewers would have made 
statistical analysis more difficult as data over time was 
limited. This was one of the major problems with the Price 
Commission's report (1977). The 15 companies selected not 
only provided a good cross section of different types of 
company (in terms of marketing and manufacturing strategy) 
within the industry, but they also had more published data 
available on each of them, of a quantitative nature and of 
a qualitative nature.
The analysis covered the period 1972 to 1982 for two
reasons.
1. The availability of some data, especially of a 
non-financial nature such as advertising expenditure 
and number of brands and pubs was very limited before 
1972. Records of non-financial data generally only went 
back around ten years.
1O8
a. CAMRA*s extensive information on numbers of brands, 
number of breweries and number of pubs for individual 
brewers only dated from around 197^.
b. Company records went back further but for reasons given 
in the next section (mainly changes in company 
ownership) this information was not used.
c. The London Business School library collection of company 
report and accounts generally went back as far as 1972, 
and for the larger companies these records are available 
as far back as I960.
d. Companies House, London, keep records on microfiche as 
far back as 1972 for most of the companies in the sample 
and before this the original copies were available for 
inspection.
Because of the marketing data limitations, 1972 was 
logical cut off point for data collection.
2. Mergers made tracking of certain company records 
difficult due to the dilemma of which company to follow 
after the merger had taken place. For example the 
mergers of Bass, Mitchell and Butler with Charrington 
in 1967 as well as the formation of Scottish & 
Newcastle and Allied in the 1960s. Takeovers were
1O9
less of a problem since the brewer making the takeover 
was be assumed to be the brewer to analysed. After 1972 
most of the concentration in the industry was by 
acquisition rather than merger and the problem of which 
brewer to follow did not arise. However takeovers by 
non-brewing firms did present a problem if subsequent 
data were not disagregated. eg Watneys accounts were not 
disaggregated from its parent company. Grand 
Metropolitan.
Criticism may be levelled at this exclusion process on 
the grounds that the effects of mergers are not 
analysed. However takeovers during the 1972-1982 period 
are covered and their effects are measured by changes 
in the numbers of breweries and its effect on 
profitability.
It would have been preferable to have had a greater data 
base but due to the above reasons it was dust not possible. 
However these parameters ensured that the industry 
sample was relatively unimpaired by conflicting data 
caused by mergers.
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CHAPTER 9: THE PATH OF ANALYSIS
Measures of performance
The over all aim of the analysis was to measure the
performance effect of different strategies followed by
competitive groups within the UK brewing industry, and
a diagram of the path of analysis is show in fig 9.1.
First a meaningful measure of "performance" had to be 
obtained. From the literature review it seemed that the 
most popular measure was the profitability of the company 
or business unit. This could be measured either by return 
on invested capital (ROI) or by return on shareholder's 
equity (ROE).
ROI was adopted as the measure of profitability rather than 
ROE, in order to compare results with previous studies, (ie 
PIMS) The widely different gearing ratios between the 
companies also make ROE a difficult measure for comparison 
purposes.
ROI as a profitability meausure in the brewing industry did 
have a problem because different brewers re-valued their 
tied estate (pubs and off-licences) at different times 
during any five to ten year period. As this revaluation was 
not consistent for any two brewers it made comparison
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PATH OF ANALYSIS
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No
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Management style, 
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decided to test its relationship with profitability by 
running a separate analysis. The measurement of 
market-share is discussed in the next chapter. From the 
literature three possible outcomes were expected:
a. Market-share was positively correlated with 
profitability. (Schoeffler, 1977)
b. Market-share was negatively correlated with 
profitability. (Price Commission, 1977)
c. No single relationship existed between the two 
variables. (Porter, 1982)
2. Cash-flow is a well used measure of performance for many 
companies. However since most of the analysis looked at 
in the literature used profitability (ROI) as the 
measure of performance, compatibility to these 
studies was considered preferable to using cash flow.
Selection of the independent variables
In any industry analysis it is obvious that much of the 
variance in profitability is determined by factors outside 
the company's control. Since this study was aimed at 
suggesting how individual brewers have affected their 
profitability through strategies adopted, only variables
that the brewers had an active role in determining were 
used. However Hatten and Schendel (1977) did include a 
market environment variable, 8 firm concentration. It was 
decided to include this market environment variable 
(following Hatten and Schendel ibid) since it measured one 
important result of competitive strategy, the changing 
share of the 8 largest brewers.
The variables to be analysed were adopted from the Hatten 
and Schendel analysis. It was decided to adopt these 
variables so that a comparison could be made with their 
study of the US brewing industry. A number of these 
variables had also been suggested as being significant both 
across industry (PIMS) and for the brewing industries of 
the US and the Netherlands (Keithahn 1978, Brouwer 1976) 
The variables were adjusted by combining with them those 
variables that were important in determining profitability 
in the UK brewing industry. (ie number of pubs and the 
advertising/sales ratio)
The selected variables were categorized into three 
areas; manufacturing strategy, marketing strategy and the 
market environment. Hatten and Schendel (op.cit) used these 
divisions as they found that the US brewers "compete by 
allocating resources to the two principal functional areas: 
manufacturing and marketing."
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Table 
Variables correlated with profitability in the analysis
Manufacturing variables
Capital intensity 
Number of plants 
Newness of plant 
Size of brewer
Market environment 
8 firm concentration
Marketing variables
Debtors/sales ratio 
Number of pubs 
Number of brands 
Adverts/sales ratio
It would have been preferable to have included price as an
independent variable in the analysis. However the
variations in wholesale and retail mark-up made comparison 
between companies difficult. Further, volume production 
figures (used to calculate price) were only available for 
the largest companies and hence it was not possible to use 
price as a variable.
The measurement of these variables are discussed in the 
next chapter.
Strategic group identification
The literature review identified the importance of
differences between firms in the same industry. These 
differences are in the way similar strategies adopted by 
firms produce very different results. The Price Commission 
(1977) actually divided the UK brewers into 4 groups of
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"similar" brewers. Hatten and Schendel (1977) also 
stressed that analysis of an industry as a whole may 
obscure information about strategic groups within the 
industry. This view was supported by Porter (1982) who saw 
an industry as being made up of a number of strategic 
groups, with the effects of competitive strategy of a 
particular firm being determined by which strategic group 
the firm happened to be in.
In view of these finding it was decided to analyse the 
brewers in the study by dividing them into strategic groups 
of "similar" firms rather than look at the determination of 
profitability aggregated for the whole sample. Hatten and 
Schendel provided a useful methodology for this process. 
They compared the combined affect of the variables on 
profitability for each brewer and clustered those brewers 
together which had a similar F/Fc ratio. (The measure of 
the combined effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable). The actual process that was involved 
is discussed more fully in chapter 13.
'it was expected that the brewers would either divide into 
strategic groups or remain as individual strategic units. 
In the event it was found that firms could not be placed 
into groups using the Hatten and Schendel method, (due to 
insufficient data for the results to be statistically 
significant) and another method of grouping had to be 
found. The answer was to use a visual inspection of
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scattergrams showing each variable's relationship with 
profitability and market-share. (Used as a measure of firm 
size) This type of analysis was also used to look at the 
market-share/profitability relationship. From this analysis 
a series of relationships were identified between 
profitability, market-share/firm-size and the independent 
strategy variables, for the industry as a whole and for 
groups of brewers in particular.
On each scattergram graph the average position of the 
brewers were plotted. The average correlation figure given 
at the bottom of each graph is the average correlation 
coefficient between the two variables on the graph. Thus 
for each idependent variable (capital intensity. 
Debtors/sales ratio etc) three graphs were presented. The 
first graph plotted the relationship between the 
independent variable and national market-share; the second 
graph plotted the relationship between the independent 
variable and ROI including property; and the third graph 
Plotted the relationship between the independent variable 
and ROI excluding property.
In the market-share/profitability analysis two graphs 
were presented. The first showed the relationship between
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national market-share and ROI including property and the 
second showed the relationship between national 
market-share and ROI excluding property.
To further clarify this stage of the analysis an example 
graph is shown (fig 9.2) On the vertical axis is ROI 
including property. On the horizontal axis is percentage 
national market-share. The graph shown plots the 
relationship btween the variables for each of the 11 years 
of data for each brewer. Numbers on the graph signify more 
than one data point in the same place. The stars besides 
the brewers' names denotes the average position of the 
brewer over the 11 year period.
The advantage of this method of analysis over the previous 
statistical grouping technique is that conclusions are 
drawn from a simple visual inspection rather from a 
statistical analysis limited by a lack of data.
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CHAPTER 10: MEASUREMENT OF THE VARIABLES
The previous chapter explained the path of analysis taken 
and the variables that were used. This chapter explains how 
these variables were measured and the problems 
experienced.
Market-share
The literature showed that the definition of market-share 
is a matter of some debate (Hatten and Hatten, 1982) and 
any market-share data will be subject to criticisms from 
one quarter or another. This study has used volume share of 
the total national UK beer market.
Most of the market-share data for the 7 largest of the 15 
brewers were available in percentage volume of the total UK 
market from stockbrokers reports and industry research 
surveys. Data for the remaining brewers were considerably 
harder to acquire since stockbroker *s estimates were 
unavailable and the brewers themselves were unwilling to 
disclose production figures. However it was possible to 
calculate the remaining brewers approximate share from 
their turnover as a percentage of the annual UK retail 
expenditure on beer. Although the brewers sales figures 
have been taken at wholesale rather than retail value, the
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figures were still compatible since there was a negligible 
difference in prices between brewers of this size. (Price 
Commission, 1977) Further, none of these brewers exported 
any significant proportion of their beer during the study 
period which might have led to price or share 
discrepancies. The small brewers had generally limited 
interests outside brewing, and beer made up the best part 
of their turnover. Hence the figures were reasonably 
comparable to the volume market-share figures of the larger 
brewers.
Regional market-share data in the UK would have also been a 
useful measure, as many of the brewers analysed had a 
strong regional bias. However this information was 
restricted to the free trade off-licence sector only (for 
individual ITV regions) and could not be used.
Profitability
The two ROI variables which were discussed and decided upon 
in the previous chapter were measured in the following way:
ROI including property: Pre-tax profit/Total net assets
including property
ROI excluding property: Pre-tax profit/Total net assets
excluding property
*Pre-tax profit is profit before tax and interest.
Manufacturing variables
1. Number of plants
This was a simple count of the number of operating 
plants owned by each brewer, for each year of the 
analysis. The data were collected from a wide variety of 
sources such as stockbroker's reports, company report 
and accounts, year books, and other secondary sources.
2. Newness of plant
This was measured by :
Net book value of fixed assets (£)/ 
Gross book value of fixed assets(£)
This measured the age of plant and machinery; fixed 
assets in property were excluded. The data were 
collected from company report and accounts.
3. Capital intensity
This was measured by: Net fixed assets (£)/ Sales (£)
this measured the companies' manufacturing assets and 
only capital invested in plant, machinery and vehicles 
were included. The data were collected from company 
report and accounts.
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Marketing Variables
1. Number of brands
This was measured by a count of brewers brands for each 
of the 11 years. The term "brand 1* was rather open to 
interpretation since brand names, beer types and company 
names can become rather confused, and the data must be 
treated with caution. In collecting the data, any 
discrepencies between sources were normally solved by 
taking the average number of brands from the sources. 
The data were collected primarily from "Off-licence 
News", company report and accounts and CAMRA.
2. Advertising
Advertising expenditure data were available in detail. 
(Information that Hatten and Schendel were unable to 
access). Advertising expenditure was measured as a 
percentage of sales per year;
Advertising expenditure (£)/Sales (£).
Advertising expenditure data were collected from MEAL 
(Media Expenditure Analysis limited) by aggregating 
expenditure on brands for each brewer, per year.
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3. Distribution
a. Number of Pubs
This variable was measured by a count of pubs owned by 
each brewer. Since ownership of tied estate was 
important it was felt that the number of pubs should be 
included as one of the marketing variables. Numbers of 
off-licences owned would have also been useful but data 
were limited. The data were collected from CAMRA and 
industry survey reports.
b. Debtors/sales ratio
This was measured by; Debtors (£)/ Sales (£)
The variable indicated how much in loans brewers gave to 
customers. Loans are given as a way to ensure new or 
continued custom from clients in the free trade. Thus 
this strategy is a tool for increasing the number of 
outlets. The data for this variable were collected from 
company report and accounts.
Market-share (Firm size)
This variable was used as a measure of the brewers' size 
in the industry and was measured as before (pl!9).
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Market Environment variable
1. Concentration
Eight firm concentration was used as a measure of the 
market environment. This was measured by the sum of the 
market share of the eight largest brewers. This measure 
gave some indication of the state of competition in the 
industry. The data were aggregated from the market-share 
figures.
Variables were automatically exluded from the regression 
analysis if they did not vary over the period of analysis 
(1972-1982) and thus did not make an impact on 
profitabilty; or were of little importance to a particular 
firm, eg pubs were not included for Guinness as they own 
none. The excluded variables are shown in appendix 2.
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SECTION FIVE: RESEARCH ANALYSIS
CHAPTER 11: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH ANALYSIS
This research investigation aimed to look at the 
determination of profitability of a sample of 15 UK brewing 
companies, and if possible the determination of 
profitability in strategic groups from the sample. A 
separate analysis on the relationship between profitability 
and market-share was carried out due to the highly 
controversial nature of the relationship. (Discussed in 
the previous chapter). The analysis followed a path which 
utilized the statistical and interview based data to 
identify groups and to assess the collective and individual 
determinants of profitability.
1. The relationship between market-share and profitability: 
This analysis confined itself to a two variable 
relationship based on statistical analysis. Firms 
were grouped according to the averages of these two 
variables. Conclusions were drawn from this as well as a 
visual inspection of scattergrams showing the over all 
interaction between the two variables and correlation 
coefficients for each identified group.
2. Having established the market-share/profitability 
relationship and having been able to point to possible 
strategic groups, the second stage of the analysis
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attempted to place the firms into strategic groups, 
determined by the combined influence of seven 
independent variables on profitability. This grouping 
process was tackled in several different ways, but 
attempting to adhere to the general methods used by 
Hatten and Schendel (op.cit). This method failed to 
successfully identify strategic groups from the analysis 
(due to statistical limitations) but it did suggest how 
the variables might affect the brewers in the industry 
sample.
3. Due to the inability of the statistical analysis to 
place the brewers into strategic groups the next phase 
of the analysis returned to the methodology of the 
market-share/profitability analysis, and looked at the 
relationship between the size of the brewer (as measured 
by market-share) its profitability and the 7 independent 
variables using scattergram graphs. This method avoided 
the statistical pitfalls that the Hatten and Schendel 
method.
The final stage of the analysis brought together 
statistical information and information gathered from 
interviews with managers in the industry to place firms 
into strategic groups highlighting the groups 
distinguishing characteristics.
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CHAPTER 12: THE MARKET-SHARE/PROFITABILITY RELATIONSHIP
Expected outcomes
The purpose at this stage of the analysis was to see what 
relationship existed between market-share and profitability 
in the particular circumstances of the UK brewing industry. 
The outcome of the analysis was expected to be negative, 
given the findings of the Price Commission. (1977) This was 
also supported by Woo (198/1) who found that "low return 
leaders were also found in greater numbers in unstable, low 
return consumer markets where costs were high and value 
added was low.'* (p52) Although stable, the brewing industry 
did as a whole have a low mark-up on beer and very high 
plant and machinery costs. Woo (ibid) also found that low 
return leaders were more likely to be found in regional 
and fragmented markets (20 or more competitors) where the 
advantages of ecomomies of scale were at a minimum. These 
circumstances were also similar to those in the UK beer 
market.
The analysis: Step one
The relationship was first tested on a visual inspection of 
tables which grouped individual firms in three time 
periods. [1972-75.1976-79,1980-82] into ROI catagories. An
129
"a priori" theory was developed from the Price Commission's 
report which divided these brackets into broadly local, 
regional and national brewers. The average position, over 
the 3 time periods, of each firm was plotted into one of 
these ROI categories.
Table 12.1 shows the brewers average ROI over the 11 year 
period with and without property ranked in order of 
average national market share over the same period. Tables 
12.2 and 12.3 show the ROI positions and market share 
averages for the brewers. Table 12.2 includes property in 
assets (for ROI measurement). Table 12.3 excludes property.
Table 12.1
Average return on investment and average market share,
1972-1982.
ROI EXCLUDING ROI INCLUDING AVERAGE
BREWER PROPERTY PROPERTY MARKET-SHARE
Bass 47.3 1/1.6 20.0
Allied 30.6 14.0 15.4
Whitbread 22.4 8.6 12.9
Scots & Newc 33.4 15.1 1O.6
Courage 33.2 12.5 9-5
Guinness 33.3 17.6 6.8
Greenall.W 6O.9 12.5 2.5
Vaux 101.0 13-1 1.65
Wolves&Dudley 1O7.2 23-2 1.2
Greene King 73.5 21.0 0.82
Marstons 54.4 17.6 0.55
Thwaites 78.2 26.1 0.52
M.Brown 185-7 17.8 0.45
Boddingtons 169.6 18.1 0.43
Young 76.7 8.3 0.41
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Table 12.2 
Comparative profitability [ROI] and market-share
including property (market share in brackets)
LOW ROI
-MEDIUM ROI
 HIGH ROI
9.0%
Whitbread
[12.93 
Young
10-15% 15-17% 17-18% 18-22% 23%-
Courage S&N Guinness Boddingtons Thwaite
[.453 
Marstons
[.55]
[9.5] [10.6] [6.8] 
Greenall M.Brown 
Whitley
[2.5]
Allied
[15.4]
Bass
[20.]
Vaux
[1.65]
[.43] 
Greene.k
[.83]
[.52] 
Wolves& 
Dudley 
[1.2]
Table 12.3
Comparative profitability [ROI] and market-share exluding
property (market share in brackets)
LOW ROI 
-45%
Whitbread
[12.9] 
Courage
[9.5]
Allied
[15.4]
Scots 8. Newc
[10.6]
Guinness
[6.8]
46-65%
Bass 
[20.0] 
Greenall 
Whitley
[2.5] 
Marston 
[0.55] 
[.41]
-MEDIUM ROI 
66-85%
Young
[0.41] 
Thwaites
[0.52] 
Greene 
King
[0.82]
86-105%
Vaux 
[1.65]
 -   HIGH ROI 
100% +
Boddingtons
[0.43] 
Wolves & 
Dudley
[1.2] 
M.Brown
[0.45]
In very broad terms it was found that higher ROI was
related to lower market-share. This relationship was
substantially more significant when property was excluded 
from the ROI measurement. However this was not a universal 
result and certain anomalies existed. Young with a very 
low national market share consistently performed badly in 
terms of profitability. Further, those with the highest
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national market shares (Bass and Allied) were not those 
with the lowest ROI. The majority of brewers with higher 
ROI and less than 2X of the market were spread over a large 
range of ROI values. Thus the market-share/profitability 
relationship could not be considered a water tight 
relationship either negatively or positively and the 
results suggested that no constant relationship existed 
across the sample.
In step two companies were split into strategic groups to 
show where the market-share/profitability relationship 
altered as market-share increased.
The analysis: Step two
The next stage used two scattergrams graphs to show the 
relationship between national market-share and ROI 
including and excluding property, for the sample. The 
graphs show the average positions of each brewer for the 11 
year period as well as the individual yearly points. The 
graph also shows the average correlation coefficient 
between the variables for the sample during the 11 year 
period.
From the scattergram graphs, four groups were visually 
identified, and confirmed by correlation analysis, to exist 
within the sample of firms. Table 12.5 sets these out and
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figures 12.1 and 12.2 show the total sample and the 
differing slopes involved.
Table 12. /*-
National market share and profitability correlation
coefficients
Market Share Correlation Coefficients
	with property without property
0.0-0.7 * *
0.7-2.8 -0.6803 *
2.8-14.7 -0.6452 -0.5492
11.9-21.0 [top 3 brewers] 0.7278 0.5201
14.9-21.0 [top 2 brewers] * *
All Industry -0.3192 -O.4661 
* not statistically significant
Results
The scattergram graphs showed that there was a substantial 
difference in relative ROI between ROI including property 
and ROI excluding property. When property was excluded the 
minor and major regional brewers attained a far higher 
average ROI than the national brewers. This finding lent 
some support to Hawkins f (1979) claim that the exclusion of 
the undervalued property of the regional brewers made them 
appear relatively more profitable. However the scattergram 
which employed ROI including property showed that despite 
this, on average the regional brewers were still achieving 
higher ROI during the study period. The two national 
brewers who displayed the highest ROI when property was 
included. Guinness and Scottish & Newcastle both had
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relatively small interests in property. (Guinness owns no 
pubs at all.) Greenall Whitley's relatively low ROI when 
property was included may be explained by the fact that for 
the average 2.5X market-share during the study period, they 
owned a disproportionate number of pubs. (An average of 
1683 during the study period). This division of 
profitability between property included and excluded 
highlighted the importance of the tied estate (pubs and 
off-licenses) to the UK brewers.
Within groups of brewers identified from the correlation 
table and visual inspection of the scattergrams, the 
following conclusions were drawn.
1. For the five smallest brewers, with market-share under 
0.7X, share gains or losses made no significant 
difference to profitability. However their good 
performance and high profitability over all may have 
been due to high market-share on a regional rather than 
on a national level.
2. The four regional brewers with market-share of between 
0.7X and 2.8% had a slightly negative relationship. 
This may imply that as they tried to move out of their 
regions, their profitability started to suffer.
3. The four minor-national brewers had a strong negative 
relationship. One of the reasons for this could be that
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the minor-national brewers may have actually had smaller 
market-share (ie thinly spread over the UK) than the 
concentrated regional brewers. This was one of the 
conclusions reached by Hatten and Hatten (1982) on the US 
brewing industry. These brewers may also not be so 
profitable due to an over spreading of resources as a 
result of trying to maintain a strong national presence, 
ie high advertising and distribution costs, (Price 
Commission, 1977).
The two large nationals showed a small positive, but 
statistically insignificant, correlation. When the 
market share threshold was lowered to 11.9% and hence 
included Whitbread, the relationship became significantly 
positive. This suggested that the improved profitability 
with increase in share was taking place at market-share 
levels below those of the top two brewers.
Conclusions
1. The minor and major regional brewers with a national 
market-share of 3% or under were the most profitable 
sector. However when property was included (in the ROI 
measurement) the distinction between the regional and the 
national brewers was far less significant. Over all the 
smaller brewer may have benefited from reduced 
competition due to the local strength of their products,
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and thus low advertising costs. Distribution costs were 
also kept low due to the local nature of these brewers. 
(Price Commission 1977) High regional market-share may 
have also been a factor in their favour although this 
could not be proven.
2. The large-national brewers with a substantial market 
share showed tendencies of increased profitability after 
gaining around 15% of national market-share. This 
compared with a general decrease in profitability shown 
by the minor-national brewers (approximately to 
12. 5X market-share). The large-national high-share 
brewer may have gained from a well organised national 
distribution system, and from being further down the 
experience curve. This may have been as a result of a 
longer history of national influence, (Boston Consulting 
Group 1968) Bass and Allied had achieved almost 
national status by the mid 19th century. (Hawkins op.cit) 
Once again these brewers were not as relatively 
successful when property was included in the ROI 
measurement.
3. The major thrust of competition in the industry took 
place between the minor-national brewers competing in 
new regions, new product areas and through new 
distribution outlets, hence keeping costs high. 
This general pattern worked to the exclusion of 
Guinness who had a near complete national distribution
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CHAPTER 13; THE STATISTICAL GROUPING PROCEDURE UTILIZING
THE HATTEN AND SCHENDEL METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The previous chapter looked specifically at the 
market-share profitability relationship. However the over 
all aim of this research project was to assess the effect 
of selected marketing, manufacturing and market 
environment variables on the profitabilty of 15 United 
Kingdom brewing companies. The Hatten and Schendel study 
(1977) of the US brewing industry provided a methodology 
for analysing the influence of these variables. The study 
provided some valuable advice on how to identify strategic 
groups within an industry, which, as the 
market-share/profitability study in the previous chapter 
demonstrated, appeared to exist within the UK brewing 
industry. The use of the Hatten and Schendel method also 
provided an opportunity to test analytical techniques in 
differing circumstances and to test its validity
Expected Outcomes
From the previous chapter on the market-share/profitability 
relationship it was clear that certain groups were 
distinguishable from the 15 companies studied. It was
1UO
expected that the groups identified in this analysis would
into similar categories. The market-share/ 
profitability analysis identified four general groups which 
are set out in table 13-1
Table 13.1
Expected competitive groups within the UK brewing industry
Major-National Minor-National Major-Regional Minor-Regional 
Bass Whitbread Greenall.W Marstons 
Allied Scots & Newc Vaux Thwaites
Courage Wolves/Dudley Boddingtons 
Guinness Greene King Young
M.Brown
In the same way that Hatten and Schendel used judgement to 
help aid their grouping procedure it was intended that 
these groups should give some guidance to the statistical 
grouping analysis.
The analysis: Stage one
The first stage produced a correlation matrix for the 
industry so that the individual firms and competitive 
groups could be compared with the industry as a whole. A 
list of the variables that were correlated with ROI 
are shown in table 13.2. The measurement of these 
variables was explained in detail in chapter 10. Only ROI 
including property was used in this analysis since it was 
felt that this measurement would more fairly distinguish 
the regional brewers from the large national
brewers. ROI (excluding property) may not have done this 
given the bias identified in the market-share analysis, 
towards the regional brewers when property was included.
Table 13.2
List of variables correlated with ROI
Capital intensity 
Newness of plant 
Number of plants 
Number of pubs 
Debtors/sales ratio 
Number of brands 
Market share 
8 firm concentration
The correlation matrix is shown in table 13-3. As was found 
in the market-share/ profitability analysis an aggregate 
of all the brewers' data may well have disguised 
relationships within groups of similar brewers. Having said 
this some fairly strong correlations did emerge from the 
analysis. The strongest correlation was between the 
number of breweries and market-share. (O.U483) This was a 
predictable result since the largest brewers, and hence 
those with the greatest market-shares, on average 
operated more plants than the smaller brewers.
The only two noticeable correlations with ROI were with the 
debtor/sales ratio and capital intensity, both of which 
were negative. As conventional wisdom (Price Commission, 
1977) suggested capital intensity was expected to have a 
negative correlation, since high capital expenditure would 
hold down ROI for some time after the investment. Given the 
cost of maintaining a high debtors/sales ratio this
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AVERAGE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS! 15 SELECTED UK BREWING COMPANIES, 1972-1982.
ROIG -.1232 -.2868 -.1123 -0166 .0312 -.1765 -.2577 -105
BRANDS .1788 .3824 .0647 .03/t3 -.1053 .0652 -.11/19
DIST * -.2^25 -.20.5^ -.3^78 .1078 «
ADWRTS 
-.14 .0311 .1953 * -.27#f
PUBS 
.1069 .1049 .0332 .14
relatonship was also expected to be negative.
8 firm concentration was correlated separately since it was 
a measure of the total industry environment and results 
of previous competitive action, rather than that of 
individual brewers. (see table 13-4) The correlation 
between average ROI (including and excluding property) for 
the sample (per year) was highly positive, slightly more so 
for ROI excluding property. This high correlation suggested 
that greater concentration in the industry had led to 
greater average profitability. The high correlations 
explain why later in this analysis 8 firm concentration was 
such an important determinant of profitability for many of 
the brewers. This is the opposite to what Gale and Branch 
found. (1982)
Table 13-4
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS; 8 firm concentration with ROI per
year, 1972-1982
8 firm concentration
ROI: including property 0.6368
ROI: excluding property 0.66UO
The analysis: Stage two
In attempting to carry out the same procedure firm by firm 
it was found that insufficient degrees of freedom existed 
to produce a meaningful result. To overcome this problem
regression analysis was carried out on groups of it/5 
variables at a time. The reduction in the number of 
variables would increase the degrees of freedom necessary 
to deduce meaningful results.
The two groups were made up of variables that were not 
highly correlated with each other to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity:
Group 1.
Capital Intensity
Newness of plant
Advertising/Sales ratio
Number of Pubs
8 firm concentration
Group 2.
Number of Brands 
Debtors/Sales ratio 
Number of Plants 
Market Share
This method did not produce statistically significant 
results since the degrees of freedom were still far too 
small. The next stage therefore, at the risk of excluding
variables, was to concentrate on the more important
variables, that predicted ROI. These were identified by a 
stepwise regression analysis which took the first most 
important variable, analysed its effect and then moved onto 
the second variable and so on. Given the fact that there 
were only 11 data points per brewer the stepwise 
regression was only statistically significant for the first 
two variables. The results in table 13-5 show the two 
variables that were the stongest predictors of ROI for each 
brewer.
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Table 13.5
The two most significant variables for explaining ROI per
brewer, 1972-1982: Correlations and influence (+ or -)
COMPANY
Bass
Allied
Scottish & Newc
Guinness
Whitbread
Courage
Boddingt ons
Thwaites
Greenall Whitley
Matthew Brown
Vaux
Wolves & Dudley
Marstons
Young
Greene King
1st variable 2nd variable
Pubs
Newness
Newness
Dist
Adverts
Pubs
Newness
Capital
Adverts
Dist
Capital
Con%
Con%
Newness
+0. 9218
-0. 8711
+ O. 6803
-0. 6598
-0. 4025
-0.796
+0.537
-0. 8662
-i-O. 87^9
+0. 7996
-o. 8896
+0. 4006
+0. 1928
+0.5953
-i-O. 5326
Dist
Dist
Dist
Con%
Dist
Dist
Capital
Adverts
Newness
Pubs
Brands
Dist
Capital
Dist
Con%
-0. 2827
-0. 1754
+0. 0049
+0. 3134
+0. 3586
-0. 7177
-0. O221
-0. 1274
+0. 0435
+0. 4723
+0. 4723
-0. 2979
+0. 0508
-0. 2736
+0. 3946
The similarities that did occur are shown below. There were 
a number of groups who had similar "First most important 
variables'* but the relationships were neither all negative 
nor all positive.
The Identified "Groups" (similar variable in brackets)
a. Boddingtons, Greene King, Scottish & Newcastle (Newness
of plant).
b. Greenall Whitley, Marston, Young (8 firm concentration). 
c. Guinness, Vaux (Distribution), 
d. Thwaites, Wolverhampton and Dudley (Capital intensity).
None of these groups comprised expected "similar" brewers
and the result may well be spurious. It was apparent that
groups may not be easy to find using this method. However a
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final test was run to see if any similarities existed 
between pairs of brewers. This was done in two stages:
1. Identification of the two most important ROI predicting, 
variables for each pair of brewers (see table 13.6). The 
identification was achieved by using stepwise regression 
analysis as used in the previous stage.
2. A comparison of F/Fc ratios between each pair of 
brewers and each brewer individually, to check how 
similar or "close" the two brewers were. This was done 
by comparing the sum of squares of the residuals for 
each individual brewer with the sum of squares for each 
pair of brewers using the two most important 
variables for each pair of brewers. This process was to 
show how close the two most important variables for each 
individual brewer were to the combined regression of the 
pair of brewers, by measuring the difference between the 
induvidual and combined regression equations. This 
analysis used the following formula:
F=(RSSC-RSST)df/2(RSST)
When; df= total degrees of Freedom for the two residuals 
RSST= residual sum of squares for two brewers
individually 
RSSC= residiual sum of squares combined
The lower the "f" value the more similar the two brewers 
would be. The matrix for the F/Fc ratios is shown in 
table 13.7.
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TIE TUP HC6T IMPORTANT VARIAB1£3 FX)H EACH PAIR OF DlgUEIS. 1972-19^2-
BASS
AIMED
SN
GUINNESS
WHITEREAD
BODDINGTONS
THHAITFS
GW
M.BHOWN
VAl/X
WD
MARSTONS
YOUNG
COURAGE
ALLIED SN GU1H
CON# COH# 001$ 
DIST CAPITA NEWNES
NEWNES DIST 
C0f$ CON#
BRAND 
DIST
WHIT BOD
DIST 1IEWNES 
PUDS CAPITA
BRF.W NEWNES 
NEWNES C0f$
PUBS CAPITA 
COW/o NEWNES
BH&W CAPITA 
NEWNES PUBS
NEWNtS 
CAPITA
THWA
PUBS 
CAPITA
PUBS 
CAPITA
CAPITA
pirns
CAPITA 
DIST
PUBS 
CAPITA
ADS 
NEWNtS
GW
con;S
PUBS
DIST
DIST
CON^
NEWNES
PUBS 
COn/o
sr
PUBS 
CAPITA
MB
DIST 
BREW
DIST 
NEWNE'S
DTST 
NEWNES
ADS;
DIST
PUBS 
DIST
COW/o 
ADS
PUBS 
ADS
ADS 
BRAND
VAUX
con?
BHAND
COU/o 
BHAND
BHAND
NEWN3
PUBS 
CON^
DIST 
CAPIT
CAPITA
CON^ 
BRAND
ADS 
COH^
WD
BRAWD 
ADS
DIST 
ffEWNES
D1J3T
ADS 
ADS
PUBS 
ADS
CAPITA 
DIST
DIST 
CAPIT
PUDS 
DIST
DIST 
ADS
DIST 
BRAND
MAR
NEWNI; :S
CAPITA 
CON#
DIST 
CAPITA
ADS 
CON?',
PUBS 
CAPITA
Nl'HIIPS 
CON^
ADS 
DIST
PUBS
cortf
ADS
DIST 
PUBS
CAPITA 
NEWNtS
YOUNG
PUBS
PUBS 
NEWNFS
puia
cor^;
AIX5
conjs
DIST
CAPITA
PUBS 
CAPITA
PUBS 
CON>t
ADS 
PUKJ
PUBS
PUBS
BRAND 
DIST
COUR
PUBS 
DIST
PUDS 
DIST
BRAND 
ADS
_
PUBS 
DIST
NI'IWMI-S 
CAPITA
PUBS 
CAPITA
puns
MEHNCS
PUBS 
ADS
DIST 
NEWNtS
PUBS 
DIST
PUB3 
DIST
PUBS 
DIST
GREENE.K
DIST
NEWNtS
DIST 
CAPITA
NEWNES
PUBS
cor$
CON^ 
DIST
NEHNES 
CAPITA
DIST 
DIST
DIST
PUBS 
DIST
NFWNI'S
CON^ 
DIST
PUDS
PUBS 
NEUNES
F'A'C MATRIX AFTER "SUM OF RESIDUAL TEST" FOR GI/6ENESS OF FIT RETWEEN TWO BRCWEHS.
ALLIFD SN GUIN WHIT BOD THWA GW MB VAUX t/D
BASS 3.9#f 1.305 11.33^ ^.258 12.871 10.783 - 1.801 2.339 1.521
ALLIC1D 
- 17.338 5.105 0.832 - .529 8.0 2-73/1 52.81 
SC'iS.NEUC 
_ 3.296 .6/16 2./I22 .37*f /f.681
"inrwiGs 
_ _ 21.972 .28 3.091 1.532 j./toz
Hlll'IUnBAD 15.083 1.68 - 
- 
- .202
BODDINCTONS
THUAITCS
O.WinTLBY
M.BItOUN
VAUX
WU
HAK3'J'ONS
YOUN(]
COUHAGE
.0/J02 11.91312.065/10.137
1.3/H 6.359 6.'^ 6.56/J
.799 -06/H l.5/»9
1.979 3-212
9-^55
MAIl YOUNG GOUR
0.170 - ^.55 
2.710 - ^-75^
i./m2 1.292
12.817 - 
1.75 0.600 2.911
1.271 6.35
./I7 2.757
1.110 .103
/K/^5
3.81
1.61 2.78/^
1.802
5.608
1.078
2./I95
3.861
-
2-539
1.913
7.82'*
GRE.EN
'I-657 
3.251 
1 .^29 
>.09'f
1.8o6
8.0
6. '130
2.619
1.776
3-7
-
.'l?0
'1.071
ND: - Not ntatictically significant
Results of the test of "Sum of Residuals" for "closeness 
between pairs of brewers
No particularly strong groups were identified from the 
results, and the number of likely groups was matched by 
a similar number of unlikely groups (see table 13-8). 
Thus for example Young was very similar to Greenall 
Whitley and Greene King with the two most important 
variables being "Pubs" and "8 firm concentration", which 
might have been expected (given their similar "regional" 
status). However the grouping of Marston, Bass and 
Thwaites, with different variables for each pairing, was 
unexpected in the light of knowledge of the brewing 
industry. (Bass being a major- national brewer and 
Marston and Thwaites being minor-regional brewers) 
Futhermore, Marston's two most influential variables, "8 
firm concentration" and "Capital Intensity" did not 
feature at all in the paired analysis.
When faced with over 50X of the "similarities" not 
being to prior expectations 3 general conclusions were 
drawn;
1. The statistical testing method was inappropriate to the 
brewing industry:
The major problem with the statistical grouping method 
was the large number of variables that were used (8),
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SIMILARITY SET.JETN THE 2 "CST r'.PCP.TAMT '/ARABLES ?OR "ACH ?AIH 0? 3.TT..T?3 .
nost iaportant 
variables ()
BASS 
(pubs, dist)
ir.T.Tm 
(new, dist)
SCOTTISH i 
:!E«CASTT^ 
(new, dist)
JWj,^11li^wO
'.list, con)
WK72HEAD 
(ads, dist)
SCSEKCTCIS 
(new, cap)
'ST.'AITCS
(cap, ads)
^HUALL
WHTTirr 
(con, aew)
H.E.10KI 
(ads, pubs)
'/AUX 
( die t , jracds )
«CL\ERH.\;'!PTCN <i 
3U3LZY 
(cap, dist)
SWH3TCMS 
'con, cap)
more similar    '   Measure of similar 
Similar brewer and the combine 
0.0 1.
!AHSTONS 
^con, new)
20DEE] 
(con, dist) (new.c
VAUX CTJ 
(con, brand) (dist, con)
GW 
(dist, con)
WD 
(pubs, ads)
ALLIED 
(new.c
(new.c
:'AHSTO;IS
(ads, dist)
d most imoortant variables ( } 
0 
SN ::B
(con, cap) (dist, brew)
WD 
(brand, ads)
GT01E 
on)
vc'Jti'G ;-:ASSTCIB
(pubs, con) (dist, cap)
3ASS S 
(con, cap) (dist, cap)
' rAUX
(new, con)
(pubs, cap)
 .' « T^T ^n/>»-C:
(pubs, cap)
H.A5STC:E ^< 
on) (new, con) 'con, dist)
on)
GCUPJ.GE 'JHIT2rc:.\D 
(new, cap) (pubs, cap)
 ~!
(pubs, cap)
Youirc Cannes s z:i :-a TH«;AIT^S
(pubs, con) (new, con) (dist, con) (ads, brands) (pubs, cap)
VAUX .'Jjizs 3Csui:;GTc:rs KASSTCIIS
(con, brands) (con, dist) (nrw.con) (-ucs.con)
(ads,:
GW 2K 
(con, brands) (con, brands)
rerani AD
(pubs, ads)
2ASS nT/.'AlTTS 
(con, new) (ads, dist)
3ASS
VA'JTC
(ads, cor
:ui:nr33 M3
(n?w,con) (ads.c
2A33 
(brands, ads)
:'..=as?c:s(cac,n= T -' >l
0
!
}
on)
ow i".< ."Ki73."-i.-'j:
(pubs, con) (dist, cap) (pubc.ca?)
3C3Ei:;cTo:is -m .'C'J:;G
(nsw.con) (cap.a^w'i (brands, dist 1

the small number of brewers analysed (15) and the 
limited number of data points (11). However, to recap, 
there were good reasons for the limited data points and 
the small number of brewing companies studied:
a. The remaining brewers in the UK were not analysed 
because of a lack of data. Data from published report 
and accounts was lacking due to the private status of 
many of the brewers. Also due to the small size of these 
brewers there was a lack of other published 
information from secondary sources covering data such 
as market-share, numbers of pubs, number of breweries 
etc.
b. Data points before 1972 were more difficult to collect, 
due to uncertainty of company history (due to mergers 
and takeovers) and limited information on marketing data 
such as brands, advertising expenditure etc.
2. The large number of variables have been unsuitable for 
this kind of analysis. Although the final groups were 
based on the two most influential ' variables, the 
combinations of 8 variables (28) made comparison 
difficult with only 15 brewing companies to compare 
with.
3. There were no identifiable groups in the brewing 
industry from 1972 to 1982.
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It may be that in terms of manufacturing, marketing and 
market environment variables no groups existed within 
the brewing industry from 1972 to 1982. During this 
period many other factors influenced the profitability 
of the brewers as well as those in the analysis. 
Further, these variables, as well as those in the 
analysis could only be expected to influence the 
profitablity of a brewer, or group of brewers, over a 
much longer period of time. (ie 15-20 years) Unless a 
very distinct relationship can be identified one must 
assume that no particluar relationships exist either for 
the industry as a whole or for groups within the 
industry during the period studied. A further point is 
that since the brewers analysed were selected to 
represent a cross-section of different strategies in the 
brewing industry it may be the case that they are, by 
definition, different rather than similar to one 
another.
Testing hetrogeneity across time
Hatten and Schendel wished to know whether the 
variables' influence on profitability were the same after 
certain "breakpoints" (important changing points in time) 
for the groups of brewers identified. However it was
decided not to pursue this stage of their analysis for two
reasons:
1. The number of data points would be even smaller than in 
the previous analysis and the statistical significance 
would be very low.
2. No particular "breakpoints" could easily be identified 
during the period, as most changes were over a period of 
time rather than in a particular year. Because of this 
the changes in the UK brewing industry, were discussed 
in chapter 7 and further discussed in the conclusions.
The next step was to return to the previous analysis 
combining the market-share variable as a measure of size 
with a variable by variable analysis with profitability.
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CHAPTER 14; ANALYSIS OF MANUFACTURING AND MARKETING
VARIABLES* RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SIZE AND 
PROFITABILITY OF THE BREWERS.
The market-share/profitability analysis revealed a series 
of relationships between the two variables for different 
groups of brewers. The groups of brewers divided reasonably 
convincingly along market-share (also a measure of size) 
divisions. The utilization of Hatten and Schendel f s study 
to group the brewers showed that no two brewers had much in 
common in terms of determination of profitability. Two 
conclusions were drawn from the analysis:
a. The statistical analysis was inappropriate to the data, 
b. The brewers were not similar in such a specific, "two 
most important" variable, way.
The objective of this analysis was to discover whether the 
groups identified in the market-share/profitablity stage of 
the analysis were also to be found when looking at the 
remaining variables' relationships with size and 
profitability. It was expected therefore that the variables 
would be size related and take the U-shaped form identified 
in the market-share/ profitability analysis. It was 
expected that this would be the case for the variables' 
relationship with profitability as well as market-share/ 
firm size.
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The manufacturing and marketing variables are set out in 
table 14.1. It should be noted that 8 firm concentration 
has been excluded from this analysis. This is because the 
variable had only 11 data points (one for each year of the
analysis) which resulted in the scattergrams simply
showing 11 clusters of data points rather than any 
meaningful relationship.
Table 14.1
Variables correlated with market-share and ROI
MANUFACTURING VARIABLES
Capital intensity 
Newness of plant 
Number of breweries
MARKETING VARIABLES
Debtors/sales ratio 
Number of Pubs 
Number of brands 
Advertising/Sales ratio
The groups were identified by a visual inspection of
Scattergrams, three for each variable. The first
scattergram shows the variables' relationship with
market-share/size the other two illustrate the
variables relationship with the two measures of
profitability. Table 14. 2 shows the average
correlation coefficient of the independent variables with 
market-share and profitability (including and excluding 
property). These coefficients gave an indication of the 
relationship between the variables in the analysis for 
whole sample. The scattergrams showed the differences and 
similarities within an industry. On each scattergram, the 
brewer's average positions were plotted to give an idea as
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to their postion within the sample. The sample average 
correlation coefficients are shown at the bottom of each 
graph.
Over all this analysis showed the interaction between 
Market-share, Profitability and the remaining variables 
for the sample as a whole and for the strategic groups in 
particular.
Table 1U.2
Industry-wide average correlation coefficients
Size/Share
ROI. 1
ROI. 2
Size/Share
ROI. 1
ROI. 2
ROI.l ROI
ROI. 2 ROI
Brands
0. 8608
-o. 3260
-0. 4368
Capital
0. 69^7
-0. 2233
-0. 420O
including
excluding
Dist
-0. 1633
0. 1035
0. 4656
Plant
0. 7870
-0. 50/12
-0. 4599
property
property
Adverts
0. 1938
-O. 3282
-0. 3020
Newness
0. 2370
0. 2500
0. 1123
Pubs
0. 6212
0. 3537
-0. 6008
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MANUFACTURING VARIABLES
Capital intensity (See figs
A generally positive correlation existed between the size 
of the brewer and capital intensity, although the two 
largest brewers. Allied and Bass, were not the most capital 
intensive. Marstons were also a highly capital intensive 
brewer and are an exception to the otherwise low capital 
intensive regionals. No significant correlation 
existed between capital intensity and ROI although the 
generally negative result when property was excluded did 
support the PIMS findings that high capital intensity 
reduces profitability, especially in the highly competitive 
minor-national segment. However some minor and major 
regional did not have high capital intensity but still had 
low profitability. Overall there was a slightly negative 
relationship between capital intensity and profitability 
but it was very weak and bore little relationship to the 
size/share correlation with capital intensity.
Whitbread had the highest capital intensity, possibly due 
to the large number of breweries they operated during this 
period. Allied and Bass operated considerably less 
breweries but at the same time had much greater volume 
sales and profitability implying greater economies of scale 
from larger plant operation. The smaller brewers probably 
had much lower capital intensity due to lower transport
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needs (included in capital intensity). This was mainly due 
to smaller and more local distribution areas than the 
national brewers. (Price Commission 1977)
There appears to have been two general strategic groups, 
the nationals with high capital intensity and the regionals 
with low capital intensity. The capital 
intensity/Profitability relationship did not distinguish 
any distinct strategic groups although the regionals did 
seem to fare better than the other brewers when property 
was excluded.
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Newness of plant (see figs Ul.tt-Ul.6)
The relationship between the size of the brewer and the 
newness of its plant and machinery was very slightly 
positive but statistically insignificant. This result 
suggested that all the brewers studied updated their plant 
and machinery at about the same rate. It appears that 
during the study period all the brewers were actively 
investing in new plant, but it was the larger brewers who 
were investing a far higher proportion of expenditure, 
thus the higher capital intensity.
The age of the brewer's plant made little or no difference 
to the overall profitability of the industry. The market 
leader, Bass did not seem to have needed any more modern 
plant to maintain its effective lead, possibly because 
their share was built up before 1972, and the benefits of 
modern plant and machinery were being reaped prior to any 
new investment.
From interviews in the industry it was apparent that modern 
equipment and continual high investment was of considerable 
importance from the smallest to the very largest of the 
brewer's questioned. This is especially since this period 
saw the rise in importance of Keg beer, followed by lager 
and, more recently, (notably for the smaller brewers), 
packaged beer for the free trade. Investment in lager and 
packaging facilities were cited as the most important
investment areas.(Price Commision, op.cit) NB. This 
investment does not include property investment.
No particular strategic groups were identified from the 
relationship between newness of plant and market-share/size 
or profitability.
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Number breweries (see figs 14.7-1U.9)
The number of breweries was positively correlated with 
market-share/size. There was a slighty negative 
relationship with profitability suggesting that over all 
more breweries do not lead to greater profitability. The 
capital intensity and newness of plant were of greater 
importance. A number of exceptions to this overall pattern 
did exist;
Guinness had only one brewery in the UK as around 3O% of 
their beer was imported from Eire.
Whitbread started the period with a very large number of 
breweries as a result of acquisitions and steadily shut 
them down over the period. Whitbread's larger number of 
breweries may have contributed to their low profitability 
as previously mentioned in conjunction with capital 
intensity. This point was emphasised by Keithahn (op.cit) 
who found that it was the brewers who concentrated on new 
plant rather than acquiring old plant that were, in the 
long run more profitable.
The number of breweries was a poor indicator of profit 
performance and better explained the differences and 
similarities in the way brewers compete indicating the type 
of organisation they were. Size of the brewery would also 
be an important factor, but data on capacity were not 
easily available.
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MARKETING VARIABLES
Distribution measure one:
Number of pubs (see figs 14.10-14.12)
The number of pubs was size related since the larger 
brewers tended to own more pubs, although there were 
exceptions. Guinness did not own any pubs and Scottish & 
Newcastle had a disproportionalty small number for their 
size. In terms of pubs Scottish & Newcastle are more of a 
major regional than a national brewer. This was also 
partially true of Courage who have a strong South England 
bias. Conversely, Greenall Whitley, normally considered a 
regional brewer, had on average more pubs than Scottish & 
Newcastle but still maintained a relatively high average 
ROI. This may have been due to their keeping to the regions 
they were strong in rather than attempting national 
distribution.
There was a correlation between the number of pubs and the 
profitability of the the brewers a relationship which was 
much stronger when property was excluded from ROI. However 
by excluding property from ROI the relationship showed the 
return on the sales of beer per pub (much higher for the 
regionals due to overall lower costs) rather than the 
return on the investment made in the property itself. It 
was this problem of how performance of a brewer's tied 
estate was assessed that had made previous measurement of
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the UK brewer's profitability so difficult. (Price 
Commission 1977)
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Distribution measure two;
Debtors/sales ratio (D/S ratio) (see figs 14.13-1^-5)
This measured the resources that were allocated by the 
brewer to give loans. Most of the loans given by brewers 
were to free trade outlets in return for selling the 
brewers* products. It was expected therefore that those 
brewers most active in the free trade would have the 
highest D/S ratios.
There was a weak negative correlation between the size 
of the brewer and the D/S ratio. A strong positive 
correlation might have been expected given the record of 
loans given to free trade clients of the big brewers. Since 
the smaller brewers did not as a rule give loans, (from 
interviews) it can only be assumed that they had slow debt 
repayment by customers.
A high D/S ratio hardly affected profitability and appears 
to have been financially well controlled. This might have 
been expected in the brewing industry where debt has 
become an integral part of the sales and marketing strategy 
for many of the brewers. Wolverhampton & Dudley stood out 
as a brewer who had avoided giving loans on the same 
scale as the other brewers and perhaps as a consequence had 
been very profitable. The D/S ratio was high for Scottish 
& Newcastle and Guinness who had considerably less pubs 
than the other nationals (Guinness have none) and may, as a
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consequence, had a greater reliance on free trade accounts 
and thus very often, loans. Sources in the brewing industry 
believe that Scottish & Newcastle have been "over keen" to 
give large loans to free trade customers. The other 
important free trade national, Whitbread, appeared to have 
made do with a far lower D/S ratio and it may be that 
Guinness and Scottish 8. Newcastle have something to learn 
from them.
Other than these exceptions no particular strategic groups 
could be identified from this analysis.
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Number of brands (see figs 1U. 16-1/1. 18)
There was a strong correlation between the number of brand 
names and the size of the brewing company. However one has 
to be careful in analysing these results as brand 
indentification and thus data collection, was difficult. As 
a rule the smaller regionals based their product portfolio 
on one brand name, often the name of the company. The 
larger regionals, through takeovers, had tended to promote 
more brands by adopting acquired brewers' brand names. The 
exception to the national brewers was Guinness whose single 
brand name represents almost the entire stout market. 
During the 1970s it was the strategy of the national 
brewers to concentrate on a selected few national brands, 
only Bass maintained a large number. Despite this the 
national and major regional brewers still maintained, on 
average, more brands during the study period, than the 
minor-regional brewers.
From previous results it was expected that the larger the 
number of brands the lower the profitability, with the 
exception of Bass and Allied. The scattergrams did not 
support this and the number of brands appeared to be 
irrelevant to the brewer's profitability. It is worth 
noting that the strategy of the small regionals in keeping 
the number of brands to a minimum may have ensured 
continued brand loyalty which did not require heavy 
promotional expenditure, and thus allowed higher
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profitability. However the number of brands and their 
effect on profitability was hard to isolate from the 
effects of other marketing strategies, due to the limited 
data and the changing brand strategies during the study 
period.
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Advertising/sales ratio (A/S ratio) (see figs 1U.19-14.21)
The over all relationship between the size of the brewer 
and the proportion spent on advertising was insignificant. 
However Guinness, Whitbread and Scottish & Newcastle spent 
considerably more (proportionally) than the other 
brewers but did not really see the returns in profitability 
as might have been expected. A possible reason for this was 
their greater reliance on the free trade and thus the need 
to spend more in this competitive market. The cost of 
sustaining national brands must have been high, but this 
does not explain why Courage, Allied and Bass had much 
lower ratios. Given Bass' dominance in pubs and 
brewery owned off-licences Bass may not have needed to 
advertise proportionally as much as the other national 
brewers, but this cannot be proven. There was a small 
negative correlation between ROI and the A/S ratio, more 
significant when property was excluded from the ROI 
measurement.
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General results
The scattergram analysis identified the following:
1. The brewers pursued manufacturing strategy in a manner 
related to their position within the UK market. ie 
number of breweries and capital intensity are 
positively correlated with market-share/ firm size. 
Number of breweries and capital intensity were not 
significantly correlated with profitability.
2. The newness of the plant was reasonably similar for all 
the brewers analysed and was neither size nor profit 
related.
3. The brewers also pursued marketing strategies in a 
manner related to their position within the UK market, 
ie number of brands, number of pubs and 
advertising/sales ratio tended to increase with the size 
of the brewer although there were exceptions.
The debtors/sales ratio was similar for all the brewers 
and did not fluctuate with either size or profitability.
5. The relationship of manufacturing and marketing 
variables with ROI excluding property tended to cast 
the regional brewers in a more favourable light. 
Despite this, the general pattern was similar between
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the two scattergrams for each variable analysed. A 
number of relative positions of firms did shift but the 
over all pattern remained the same.
Thwaites had a much lower ROI when excluding property 
and this may have been due to a very low valuation on 
their property thus increasing ROI. Boddingtons and 
Matthew Brown experienced very high ROI when property 
was excluded from the ROI measure.
Conclusions
What the scattergrams illustrated was that with or without 
property included in the ROI measure the smaller brewers 
still tended to be more profitable than the large brewers. 
As in the market-share/ profitability analysis the results 
do lend some support to Hawkins' (op.cit) contention that 
division between ROI including and ROI excluding property 
distorts the results. However the distortion was minimal 
and the regional brewers were still more profitable during 
the study period.
Although many of the variables bore a close relationship to 
market-share/ firm size, they did not show much correlation 
with profitability, even given the two measures, including 
and excluding property. From this analysis we can conclude 
that the brewers pursued differing strategies according to
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their size. However these strategies did not affect 
profitability in any uniform way. Because of this the next 
step in the analysis introduced qualitative data to see if 
the size based groups were similar in any non-quantifiable 
way. It was hoped that factors other than the marketing and 
manufacturing variables would help to explain the differing 
profitability levels.
CHAPTER 15; THE IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC GROUPS IN THE
UK BREWING INDUSTRY
Introduction
Knowledge of the industry and qualitative data have been 
cited in the literature as crucial to the understanding of 
competitive strategy within an industry. (Porter 1982) It 
was felt therefore that these factors should be taken into 
account by using a qualitative based analysis in addition 
to the previously described quantitative based analysis.
The aim of this stage of the analysis was to place the 
brewers into strategic groups and to identify the 
particular competitive features associated with each group. 
It was expected that the groups identified would closely 
conform to those already identified from the previous 
analysis and it was hoped that the qualitative variables 
would serve to illuminate the quantitative findings.
Data collection
The data for this analysis was derived from interviews with 
managers in the industry, other industry knowledge, and the 
results of the previous analyses of this study.
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The interviews were carried out with the intention of 
obtaining information on how the company operated in terms 
of manufacturing and marketing strategy, and how the 
company saw itself in terms of strategy and the competitive 
background of the industry.
The interviews also aimed to assess how relevant the 
analysis was to the realities of the industry and whether 
the brewers used any of the formal strategic marketing 
planning methods discussed previously. Once these areas 
had been discussed, information about the manager himself 
was sought. In addition, an attempt was made to gain a 
gereral overview of how the company worked, in terms of 
management, industrial relations and other related 
information that might reveal the structure of that 
company. Some information collected in this way was 
considered confidential by the interviewees, and as a 
result the strategic group analysis does not delve too 
deeply into individual company detail.
The response to requests for interviews was best amongst 
the regional brewers. The larger brewers cited sensitivity 
of the topics to be discussed as the main reason for 
declining an interview. This is hardly surprising when one 
realises the highly competitive nature of the industry at 
national level. Eight brewers from the sample of 15 were 
interviewed with the distribution over the sample being; 
one major-national, three minor-nationals, two
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major-regionals and two minor-regionals. The format of 
the questions asked are set out in apppendix 5«
Expected outcomes
From the previous analysis it appeared that the brewers 
divide along size divisions. The exact division between the 
regional and the national brewers was rather blurred with 
elements of both overlapping each strategic group and 
the results did not provide cut off points for each 
strategic group. It was expected that the groups 
indentified would be similar to those already identified in 
the previous analysis. Before setting out these groups it 
must be made clear that the groups were of a flexible 
nature and exceptions and anomalies exist, and that the 
brewers in each strategic group were "similar to" rather 
than "the same as" each other.
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Strategic group one
Market environment:
Marketing strategy:
Minor-Regionals
Young
Thwaites
Marstons, Thompson and Evershed
Matthew Brown
Boddingtons
Small market share even in their 
own served market or region 
Small distribution area
Single brand
Little or no advertising
Low relative prices
Manufacturing strategy: Low capital intensity
Single brewery 
Emphasis on traditional products
Other: Mainly family run and owned 
Very little diversification 
brewing and selling beer 
High relative profitability
from
Since 1982 Thwaites, Marstons and Matthew Brown have all 
taken over other brewers. This represented a change in 
strategy from the 1970s and reflected a general desire to 
expand through the tied trade rather than the very 
competitive free trade, if possible. For Thwaites and
Marstons this resulted in the closure of the acquired
brewery with the tied estate (previous-ly owned by the
acquired brewery) being used to sell the new owner's
products. During the study period the minor-regional
brewers experienced considerable growth in their
traditional product area of cask-conditioned bitter and 
were late in, or have yet to start, brewing lager. This may 
become a financial drawback in the future if the proportion 
of lager consumed continues to rise.
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Strategic group two; Major-regional
Wolverhampton & Dudley 
Greenall Whitley 
Greene King 
Vaux
Market Environment: At least the second largest share
of their served market or region
Marketing strategy: Normally 2/3 distinct brands
Limited advertising and promotion 
Low relative prices
Manufacturing strategy: Normally 2/3 breweries
Definite expansion plans either
through acqusition or
diversification
Mainly traditional beer as the
major product
Other: Mainly family run and owned
Little overseas interest 
High relative profitability
The major-regionals were less homogeneous than group 
one. Greene King and Wolverhampton and Dudley, despite 
their size, operated in a more similar way to the minor 
regionals. The other two major-regionals, Greenall Whitey 
and Vaux, operated substantially outside the field of 
brewing, where as Greene King and Wolverhampton and Dudley 
were almost exclusively in the business of brewing and 
selling beer. Like the minor-regionals these brewers were 
slow to opt for lager production, but were keen to expand 
within their traditional product range. Greenall Whitley 
stood out as having made very successful gains in the vodka 
market. These brewers have also moved more towards a 
product rather than outlet orientation, by establishing 
formal marketing functions to promote their products 
outside their own tied estate.
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Strategic group three; Specialist brewer
Guinness
Market Environment:
Marketing strategy:
Other:
The main brand "Extra stout" has 
over 95% of the UK bitter stout 
market
No tied outlets
High advertising and promotion
High overseas interests 
Considerable diversification 
Limited family interest
Guinness, although in terms market share and turnover 
are more like a Minor-national brewer, it is unique in that 
it ownes no public houses, and has a near monopoly and 
national distribution of the UK stout market.
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Strategic group four: Minor-national
Market environment:
Marketing strategy
Courage
Watneys (not in the analysis but
important)
Whitbread
Scottish & Newcastle
Dominant share of their own served 
market or region plus over 6% of 
the national market.
High advertising and promotion
Initally heavy promotion of a
limited number of national brands;
change to promotion of regional
brands after 1977/78.
High expenditure on loans to free
trade.
High relative prices.
Manufacturing strategy
Other:
High expenditure on increasing
capacity.
High proportion of Keg bitter and
lager.
Large wine and spirits interests. 
Considerable diversification: 
or owned by a parent company. 
Varying overseas interests. 
Small family influence. 
Low relative profits
Scottish & Newcastle were slightly different in that they 
owned considerably less pubs than the other national 
brewers (on average even less than Greenall Whitley) but 
achieved national distribution through the free-trade. 
Scottish & Newcastle have a poor standing amongst other
brewers not least because of their excessive use of 1 oans
and poor quality of their products. Whitbread are seen as 
being rather more traditional in their approach while, on 
the other hand, to quote one observer of the business, 
"Watneys have a reputation for being run by second hand car 
salesmen. "
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Strategic group five Major national
Bass
Allied Lyons
Market Environment
Marketing strategy:
The biggest or second biggest share 
of the national market 
Dominance in one or more regions 
A Long period of national influence 
and operation
Moderate relative prices
High profitability
Other strategies similar to minor
regionals
Manufacturing strategy: Similar to minor nationals
Other: Very large number of pubs
High overseas involvement
Much reduced family involvement
Considerable wines and spirits
interests
Considerable diversification
In many respects the major nationals were similar to those 
brewers in strategic group four but tended to have the edge 
in terms of performance and market share. Bass did have a 
number of important differences from Allied. They adopted 
a multiple brand strategy some time before Allied and were 
quick to to gain share leadership in the expanding lager 
market. It was found from the interviews that Bass were 
considered the leading brewer in terms of quality of 
management. These skills were based on very short term 
objectives and tight financial control. Although one 
regional brewer considered Allied to have been more 
successful than Bass in in competing with them, not all 
those interviewed shared this opinion.
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Summary
A large number of qualitative variables contributed to the 
identification of similarities between brewers which were 
not covered in the mulitvariate analysis. ie family 
control, diversification, overseas interests and regional 
influence. The importance of these variables was difficult 
to measure but from the interviews and knowledge of the 
industry they were certainly important in determining 
profitability in the 'industry. This dichotomy between the 
importance of these qualitative variables and the 
quantitative variables used in the previous analysis is 
important. Even if the major determinants of profitability 
are identifiable, the undefinable effect of the qualitative 
variables must still be taken into account. In effect this 
leaves this kind of analysis an art rather than a science.
The interviews and other qualitative knowledge of the 
industry were instrumental in understanding the context in 
which the quantitative analysis was carried out. It 
was clear that neither a wholly quantitative nor wholly 
qualitative analysis was possible in this industry. The 
course of competitive strategy taken by individual brewers 
partly depends on the attitudes and ideas of those in the 
company, and these are very hard to define in any 
quantifiable way. However this combined analysis has 
pointed out some of the strategies adopted and whether they 
have been profitable to the brewers or not.
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CHAPTER 16: CONCLUSIONS ON COMPETITIVE STRATEGY IN THE UK
BREWING INDUSTRY.
Introduction
The conclusions are divided into three areas; conclusions 
on the determination of profitability in the UK brewing 
industry and the identification of strategic groups; a 
comparison with the US and Dutch experience; and 
conclusions on the analysis and methodology adopted. These 
are followed by recommendations for further research in the 
area.
Profitability determination and strategic groups in the UK 
brewing industry
The results of the analysis (quantitative and qualitative) 
made it clear why the small and regional brewers have been 
more successful, in terms of profitability, than the large 
brewers. They spent less on new products, promotion, 
distribution and administration. They could not afford to 
give loans to the free trade to secure new business so they 
did not. They were not able to produce lager which had the 
brand strength to compete in the free trade so their lager 
remained in their own tied outlets. Whatever the long term 
prospects are, the small and regional brewers had succeeded
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by doing what they do best, selling traditional beer to an 
appreciative local customer via the safety of their own 
licensed estate.
From the interview based, qualitative data the following 
conclusions can be drawn. Within their catchment area the 
regional brewers were able to capitalize on the free trade 
due to the local or regional strength of their name. The 
work of CAMRA made the names of many of these smaller 
brewers well known in the larger urban areas, especially 
London. Those regional brewers that had been able to 
establish free trade accounts or even buy pubs in the 
capital found that the extra margins on the beer more than 
made up for the increased distribution costs. There is no 
doubt that there will always be a market for their beer, 
but the inroads lager has made in recent years leads one to 
wonder just how much of a market will be left. The regional 
brewers so far have been quite adept at maintaining their 
position as much of the fierce competition has taken place 
away from their traditional product areas. This has been 
seen to be quite clear from the analysis with small brewers 
consistently outperforming their larger rivals in terms of 
profitability. A further reason may be because the national 
brewers have been so inept at competing against them. These 
strategies clearly reflect a combination of cost 
leadership and focused strategies. Due to cost limitations 
the small brewers remained where they were and experienced 
considerable success. This success may not contiue as the
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industry settles down after the rapid change of the sixties 
and seventies and in its maturity, as Porter suggests, 
competition becomes more intense.
The analysis clearly indicated that the national brewers in 
comparison experienced a rather difficult past 15 years, 
with over all strategy taking drastic U-turns and 
altogether showing a distinct lack of foresight, most 
especially in the bitter market. This is with the notable 
exception of Bass who, through a well organised strategy 
managed to maintain over all share-leadership. Perhaps 
more importantly, they have been able to maintain a 
proportionally greater share in the growing lager 
market than in the stagnant bitter, and declining mild 
sectors.
Once again, from the interviews, one can explain the 
environment that produced the general divergence in success 
between the brewers. At about the time of the beginning 
of the study period (1972) the national brewers had 
embarked on two major strategies. The first strategy was 
to promote national brands of beer, replacing the regional 
names acquired during the 1950s and 1960s. This strategy 
for all intents and purposes was a disaster. The national 
keg bitters were not popular,and beer drinkers opted for 
either lager or, if they could find it, traditional bitter; 
especially from the regional brewers. Once again Bass were 
able to capitalize on this reaction, for although they did
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adopt a national brand strategy many of their regional 
brands remained. Coupled with this Bass consistently 
maintained the largest proportion of traditional bitter of 
all the national brewers. Even if Bass' national brands 
were unpopular, their strong lager and traditional beer 
portfolios would still benefit. It can be seen from the 
results of the analysis and these conclusions why Bass have 
fared so well when compared to the other national brewers.
The second major strategy was to invest in modern plant 
and machinery to develop a series of large centralized 
breweries capable of producing both lager and bitter almost 
exclusively in keg form. This high investment in the 1970s 
ensured that the national brewer's profitability was well 
below that of the regionals with or without property 
valuations.
The UK brewers within the identified strategic groups 
(major and minor nationals, major and minor regionals) did 
have considerable characteristics in common, covering 
manufacturing and marketing strategies and management 
style. Having pinpointed these strategic groups, and from 
the market-share/profitability analysis, identified the 
most profitable, we must conclude that over all a whole 
range of factors contributed to the relative profitability 
of the 15 brewers analysed. No individual variables had any 
strong effect on the brewers profitability other than the 
size of the brewer. Size related groups thus seem to best
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explain differences and similarities of strategies between 
brewers in the UK.
It appears however that no hard and fast rules govern those 
who are most profitable on an individual basis, with some 
brewers profitability being totally out of character with 
the general profitability of their strategic group. This 
may well be due to differing management ability. Having 
said this, the previous literature and comments (press 
articles and so on) covering the UK brewing industry during 
the study period were similar to the findings and 
conclusions of this analysis. This finding is significant 
and shows that even if firms are placed into strategic 
groups of "similar brewers" they still may not necessarily 
experience similar levels of success. It is at this point 
that statistical analysis becomes difficult due to reduced 
data and thus reduced degrees of freedom (a problem 
Hatten and Schendel found). To analyse differences between
h
firms within groups, more subjective analysis is necessary 
as was used in the final qualitative analysis. This trade 
off between quantitative and qualitative analysis will be 
returned to later. At this point it is worth mentioning 
that if analysing data on groups within single industries 
produces so much variance, the worth of PIMS type 
analysis, using only aggregated across industry data, must 
be seriously questioned.
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The future of the UK brewing industry
By 1977/78 it was apparent to most of the national brewers 
that national brand keg beer was not an overwhelming 
success and as a result, a profusion of regional 
traditional beers were introduced together with a more 
regionalized management structure. There are signs that 
even this strategy change will be short lived with the 
merging of regional divisions and reduction of the number 
of regional beers already taking place amongst the national 
brewers, eg Watney's merger of their Webster's and Wilson's 
divisons in March 1985 and Whitbread's merger of their East 
Midlands and Yorkshire divisions in May of the same year.
A further problem remains as to whether the high capital 
investment will pay off. During the period of analysis 
(1972-1982) it was apparent that it did not. With the 
stagnant and highly competitive market it seems unlikely 
that the excess capacity created during the 1970s will ever 
be utilized. Certainly no great export drive in lager seems 
to be looming on the horizon (as promised in the 1977 NEDC 
report). The only other alternative would be to close the 
smaller, usually traditional beer producing, breweries. 
Other than loosing traditional beer facilities, this would 
appear to be a sound strategy. The analysis suggests that 
Whitbread, who have been most active in this way, did 
benefit from such a strategy.
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The need to utilize excess capacity has not led to many 
serious price wars, not least due to the limited senarios 
in which to fight one. (Mainly because of the security of 
the tied trade). Heavily differentiated products also makes 
price differences less important. This takes into account 
the pub as a "product" as well as the drink it serves. 
(Erroll op.cit)
Given the already strong position of the brewers in the 
retail trade and the spare capacity problems encountered 
with brewing, one possible suggestion is for the national 
brewers to pull out of brewing and concentrate on retail 
outlets instead. In this way they could act as wholesalers 
for other companys' products, such as imported, packaged 
premium beer, a particularly strong growth market at 
present. Along with wines and spirits, bottled premium beer 
and the growing pub food sector, have substantially higher 
profit margins than draught bitter or lager. An example of 
retail diversification is Guinness who have a reasonably 
safe, if rather dull, market in stout plus the successful 
Harp lager brand. They have recently become the UK's 
largest newsagent and also estabished a series of general 
grocers, the 7-Eleven chain. Unlike previous 
diversifications this strategy appears to be working well 
and may have relieved some pressure from the competitive 
beer market.
There are doubts as to whether the successes of the
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regional brewers and the problems of the national brewers 
will continue. Given the present state of the 
industry,expansion would be expensive and possibly provoke 
strong reaction from competitors and the Monopolies 
Commission. Not all the smaller brewers have been as highly 
profitable as the analysis suggests, and similarly, at the 
other end of the scale, not all the nationals have faired 
badly. One manager in the industry believed in a future 
senario of six or so regional brewers, the nationals and 
Bass (the market leader) as the only remaining competitors. 
This implies that as the market retracts the small and 
regional brewers will start to acquire one another. This 
process has been quite noticeable in recent years. ie 
Marston's acquisition of Border (1984), Matthew Brown's 
acqusition of Theakstons (1984) and Boddington's 
acquisition of Higsons (1985).
The adoption of these differing strategies to off set the 
problems of excess capacity and stiffening competition 
reflect a need to adapt to the transition taking place. 
This the brewers have done, with, as the quantitative 
analysis showed, varrying success. However the industry is 
becoming harder to define with some brewers having 
large interests in growth industries related to brewing, 
(eg wine and food) making the industry boundaries blurred. 
This has made definning the industry, and thus what stage 
of growth it is in (as suggested by Porter) increasingly 
difficult.
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Summary
It can be said that the UK brewers are pursuing two general 
goals. The majority of the regionals are set to gain share 
and increase in size through their beer products, if 
possible by acquisition of new outlets, but they are not 
afraid to compete in the competitive free trade if 
necessary relying on quality and and price, rather than 
loans. The large, national brewers, with the exception of 
Scottish and Newcastle, would prefer to expand into leisure 
in general and away from the beer market in which 
meaningful growth on a large scale is limited. For 
example investment in individual pubs and projects on a 
site by site basis has been more aimed at holding rather 
than expanding share. As far as perception of what industry 
the brewers are in, the most common difference is that the 
regionals are in "brewing" and the nationals are in 
"leisure". To sum, up one manager put the difference down 
to the fact that the regional brewers just cannot afford to 
throw money at every new fad in the drinks/leisure industry 
as the national brewers have been able to do. As a result 
the brewers present a dichotomy between traditional 
conservatism and dynamic, if sometimes misguided, 
innovation.
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Comparison with the United States and Dutch brewing 
industries.
Compared to the US, the UK brewing industry does have 
some interesting similarities. The market leaders in both 
countries are obviously very strong companies and do not 
look to be seriously threatened by other competitors. It 
is also considered in the US that many regional and small 
national brewers will fail due to an inability to 
successfully adopt cost leadership, focus or 
differentiation strategies. (Hatten and Hatten 1980) There 
is a belief that the small specialised brewers will 
continue to thrive and there are signs of a small but 
growing consumer movement in favour of more traditional 
beer. (Keithahn op.cit) However this movement in no way 
compares to that of the UK CAMRA campaign and the smaller 
US brewers do not have the protection of tied 
outlets or the market strength of non-lager type beers.
The Dutch brewing industry is very different to those of 
the UK and the US, with Heineken dominating the market. 
However, since their merger with Amstel in 1969 Heineken 
have found it more lucrative to export than to compete for 
a limited home market. This has enabled a number of 
regional brewers to thrive, as well as the Belgian owned. 
Stella Artois. Ironically the second largest and one of 
the least profitable brewers in the Netherlands is Skol, 
owned by the UK brewers Allied-Lyons. Skol is the the UK's
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biggest overseas lager operation and it appears that all 
the time and effort to produce and promote lager in the UK 
has not rubbed off on Allied'e operation abroad. It is 
obvious that lessons can be learnt from Heineken, although 
to be fair Heineken have been in the international lager 
business for over 100 years as compared to the UK brewers 
15 to 20 years experience.
The predominace of more than one major beer type in the UK 
has ensured that the regional and local brewers have 
survived. Even in a "single beer type" market like the USA 
or the Netherlands, the smaller brewers have been able to 
continue in business or even thrive. In some ways the US 
and Dutch industries demonstrate that despite continued 
concentration in the industry the smaller and often more 
profitable brewers do have a role to play; not least in 
providing local beer to suit local tastes, at competitive 
prices.
Having said this in some ways the US and Dutch industries 
display the type of scenario that could take shape in the 
UK brewing industry if;
a. the tied house system was greatly relaxed allowing 
greater product mobility. ie ease of access to new 
regions,
b. the taste for one type of beer became almost universal,
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(ie lager)
c. the monopoly controls were relaxed.
d. the consumer pressure for traditional beers weakened.
Over all the comparisons with these industries allows us to 
appreciate under what circumstances certain strategies may 
or may not be successful. For example in the Dutch beer 
market Heineken have been able to dominate with a premium 
priced product, due to the effectiveness of urban 
advertising and the control over tied outlets. However to 
achieve this (as in the US market) low product 
differentiation is necessary and where perceived quality is 
more important than actual quality. Once again analysis 
such as PIMS may obscure the obvious differences between 
these industries and the lessons that might be learnt. Only 
by analysing individual industries and groups and firms 
within that industry can sure qualitative or quantitative 
results be obtained.
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Summary
What the analysis shows is that there are different 
brewers, who, by pursuing strategies in combinations unique 
to that company, have experienced different rate of 
profitability. The way in which the brewers analysed have 
tackled the changes in the market underlines some of the 
problems and advantages in trading in a volatile 
environment possibly reaching maturity.
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CHAPTER 17: CONCLUSIONS ON THE ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY
The statistical grouping process
It must be said from the outset that the adoption of 
Hatten and Schendel's (1977) methodology was not as 
successful as anticipated. The statistical method was 
unable to cope with the small number of data points 
combined with the large sample of brewers and variables. 
This meant that much of the analysis had to depend upon 
qualitative data to produce strategic groups. This made 
judgement much more prominent in the analysis than was 
originally intended.
Hatten and Schendel's (op.cit) methodology was found to be 
weak in that it could not cope with short to medium term 
analysis. The large amount of data over time required for 
the analysis to work properly did tend to make the analysis 
less relevant to current business decision making. If the 
model cannot cope with short term analysis and forecasting 
it is debatable how useful it is in a business 
environment. The use of stepwise regression did, however, 
manage to identify the two most important variables for 
predicting ROI for each company. This type of information 
could be of some value to managers when resource allocation 
decisions are being made between manufacturing and 
marketing strategies. Although the identification of the
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"two most important variables" did not strictly adhere to 
the Hatten and Schendel (op.cit) method it did show that 
this type of analysis could be useful in explaining ROI 
determination.
The Hatten and Schendel (op.cit) method may be more suited 
to long term econometric analysis in which results do not 
have to bear any immediate relevance to a particular 
industry or business. To be fair, Hatten and Schendel 
(op.cit) only used the brewing industry as a laboratory 
for testing the model. The motive for this study was to 
look more at the brewing industry rather than to explore 
differing ways of analysing and grouping data. As a 
consequence the study was more prepared to use other means 
of extracting information from the data, rather than 
adhering to any particular model. There were elements of 
this kind of flexibility in Hatten and Schendel f s (op.cit), 
(eg use of Judgement) in identifying groups. However it was 
not used to the same extent as it was in this study.
This analysis demonstrates the difficulties in trying to 
apply econometrics to a Business strategy problem. To make 
effective use of the quantitative methods used in this 
study far more data would be needed. This would require 
more openess from those in the industry under examination 
in providing data, or greater use of more "historic" 
information. However the openess of managers in the 
business tends to be dictated by the degree of competition
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in the industry. Further, the increased use of historical 
data does reduce the relevance of the results to current 
management decision making. How relevant older data is 
depends on how long term decisions (investment, marketing 
etc) are in the industry.
The use of the method did not identify homogeneous groups 
in the brewing industry but strategic groups may very well 
not exist in the form that Hatten and Schendel (op.cit) 
envisaged. Further analysis showed that the UK brewers may 
act in a similar manner, according to their strategic 
group, but the effects of the strategies may not affect any 
two brewers in the the same or even a similar way. This 
became more clear as the qualitative analysis was 
introduced. Doing the same thing did not necessarily bear 
the same fruit. It may be that a combination of strategies 
would produce similar results in the end but this would 
ignore the effect of individual strategies. However it 
could also be due to the fact that even very minor 
differences in strategy, or even luck, possibly undetected 
in the analysis, may lead to considerable differnces in 
profitability. It was because of these n-on-quant if iable 
differences that the use of qualitative information was 
necessary.
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The market-share profitability relationship
The analysis was able to identify distinct groups based on 
the relationship between market-share/firm size and 
profitability. The U-shaped curve which the analysis 
produced which was similar to one of the scenario's 
proposed by Porter (1980) with the successful adoption of 
the three generic strategies of cost-leadership, focus or 
differentiation. However the numerous exceptions to the 
general curve do cast doubts on the usefulness of the 
results. The method used in the analysis was also rather 
simplistic in its use of statistics, relying on dust 
scattergram diagrams. Despite these critisims the 
method did manage to visually describe a relationship 
without recourse to statistical anlaysis which may not have 
been as reliable. The results point out that "big can be 
beautiful" and "small can be best" at the same time. It 
does show that this research supports to some extent 
previous work (ie PIMS, Woo, 198/1 and the Price 
Commmission, 1977) in this area. Importantly it also 
challenges the assumption that market-share is a desirable 
and necessary goal. (Portfolio analyis, market 
attractiveness, business position assessment and PIMS). The 
results suggest the importance of looking at empirical data 
for the industry and firms within the industry before using 
any analytical techniques that make assumptions about 
particular relationships between variables.
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The lack of any clear cut results is a disappointment. 
However it would be fair to conclude that a relationship 
would be hard to identify when only 15 brewers are in the 
analysis. By using this small sample the results can only 
be considered an indicator of the relationship between 
market-share and profitability in the industry. However it 
is worth pointing out that these 15 brewers (out of around 
78 in the UK) produce over 85% of UK output and thus 
represent most of the brewing industry in terms of volume.
The multivariate analysis
The multivariate analysis which looked at the relationship 
between profitability and market-share with the selected 
manufacturing and marketing variables utilized a similar 
methodology to the market-share /profitability analysis. 
Unlike the complex statistical problems of the Hatten and 
Schendel method, the use of just scattergrams allowed the 
results to be presented in the simplest possible manner. 
Although this type of analysis explained little in the way 
of cause and effect it did clearly state how the 
relationships between the variables exist. The comparison 
between each variable, the brewer's size and profitability 
enabled the- research to identify this tri-variate 
relationship for each variable. The results suggested how 
individual strategies have been adopted by the brewers, and 
whether they had a positive effect on profitability and
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market-share in the sample as a whole. Although the 
positions plotted on the graphs were only averages, the 
variations in positions of the brewers were such that 
conclusions on strategic moves could be made. This was 
aided to a large extent by prior knowledge of the industry.
Some of the results were surprising in that so little 
correlation actually existed between the independent 
variables and profitability, either including or excluding 
property in the profitability measure. The graphs utilizing 
ROI exluding property did improve the results, probably 
because they excluded property which has been so erratic 
in its valuation in the industry. Otherwise one must 
conclude that many of the selected independent variables 
had little bearing on profitability on an individual basis 
and only collectively, with other non-quantifiable 
variables, did they explain variations in profitability.
The introduction of qualitative data
In the final section of the analysis the strategic groups 
and strategies identified were confirmed by introducing 
non-quantifiable variables into the analysis. The exercise 
was useful in that it ensured that any relationships 
identified, or conclusions drawn, could be supported by 
qualitative data (collected by interview) from the industry 
itself.
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From the interviews it was apparent that management 
attitudes and perceptions of the industry and the role the 
business played in that industry, were as important to the 
operation of the company as the quantitative variables 
were. The aims of these companies were different even to 
the degree as to what industry they were in (eg brewing or 
leisure). There was a fair degree of correlation between 
what kind of company (in terms of management style) and the 
influence of certain variables on profitability and their 
relationship with the size of the company. Thus for 
example, it was no surprise that the small regional family 
run business had a very low advertising/sales ratio and 
relatively high profitability.
Quantitative or qualitative analysis?
From the analysis it is clear that Porter's (op.cit) use of 
more qualitative analysis is paramount to understanding 
competition and hence profitability determination in an 
industry. Even in the highly statistical based studies of 
Schendel & Patton (op.cit) and Hatten and Schendel (op.cit) 
they stressed a need for knowledge of the industry and its 
structure. That there was a need for qualitative analysis
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of the industry was never in doubt, what was unknown was 
how reliant the results and conclusions were to be on non- 
statistical data. This is not to underestimate the 
importance of the statistical analysis, in some areas, 
words are no substitute for figures for stressing a 
relationship. This was shown most significantly in the 
market-share profitability analysis. It also lends support 
to to trend identification in the industry, ie we know that 
the small brewers did well from focused strategies, but by 
how much?
Of significant importance, and a factor brought out by the 
interviews, was how subjective the brewing industry 
actually is. Many decisions are based, not on appraisal of 
strategies using formal econometric techniques, but on 
hunches, sentiments and the like. Hence this kind of 
industry may be better suited to analysis that reflects the 
way the industry is run, rather than any particular 
qualitative method. Porter does stress this by looking at 
individual components of the industry as well as the 
industry as a whole. Porter produces a framework to assess 
the industry but without the use of statistical 1 
analysis. The statistical analysis may be unable to cope 
with many un-quantifiable factors and subtlies which 
explain the way in which the industry operates.
There are two important lessons to be learnt from the 
analysis if further work is to be carried out in this
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field.
1. Never make assumptions about relationships before 
testing them in the particular environment in which the 
analysis is being carried out. eg the market-share 
profitability relationship.
2. Be more guided by intuition rather than any 
overstructured analysis that could limit or ignore 
important factors, eg take into account subjective data.
These statements support a combined ued of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. Being guided by intuition may well 
lead to assumptions that are not necessarily empirically 
proven, eg big firms are more profitable is intuatively 
appealing, and may often be the case, but may not be so in 
the particular circumstances being examined.
The statistical methods employed to analyse the US brewing 
industry (Hatten & Schendel and Hatten & Patton) are 
certainly not sufficient to explain profitability in the UK 
brewing industry. However to actually test or prove 
information gathered by a qualitative, Porter style 
analysis is not possible without the use of hard 
statistical data. Statistical analysis may be crude and 
difficult to carry out, but qualitative data is difficult 
to assess in any measureable way.
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Summary
The analysis can be considered a cautious success and has 
certainly produced some interesting results. The main 
purpose of the analysis was to identify the determinants of 
profitability using statistical data. The extensive use of 
qualitative data reduced the reliance on the quantitative 
data rather more than was anticipated. Thus the importance 
of qualitative analysis.
Justification for adopting this method is clear since the 
statistical analysis, even if more substantial data base 
had been available, was inadequate for an industry in which 
non-quantifiable factors such as family control and and 
tradition played such an important role.
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CHAPTER 18: SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The analysis has been able to point out how different 
brewers have adopted different strategies with varying 
degrees of success. It would be useful to undertake a 
comparative analysis of some selected European brewing 
industries to see what strategic patterns emerge given 
their differing structure to the UK brewing industry. It 
would be wise to extend the period of analysis to around 20 
years or 20 data points (if the data was quarterly or 
bi-annually). The analysis of the determination of 
profitability abroad should provide valuable lessons as to 
how and why some European brewers have been so successful 
in an international market as compared to UK brewers. 
Since this study compared the UK and the US brewing 
industries both very large producers, a comparison between 
between the Belgian and Dutch brewing industries both 
relatively small but with many elements in common (ie 
Stella Artois) would be an interesting start. It is also 
apparent that more qualitative data should be employed, 
especially when analysing differences within strategic 
groups.
The analysis spent some time looking at the market-share 
profitability relationship. However it tended to 
concentrate on national volume-share when many of the 
brewers analysed tended to operate on a regional rather
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than national level. Further work should look at this 
relationship, utilizing regional data to look at how 
important regional strength might be in determining 
profitability. This analysis could be carried out either in 
the UK or in an overseas brewing industry, depending on the 
availability of data. The Netherlands may be an 
interesting comparison in this respect due to the 
significant difference between Heineken and the "rest". 
Another important area of analysis would be to looked 
competition within market segments, not just on a 
geographical basis but in terms of either products or type 
of outlets. This kind of analysis may be better able to 
pinpoint competitive action in the brewing industry and how 
and where the profits have been made.
The analysis pointed out the necessity of qualitative data 
when attempting a quantitative analysis. Further research 
should look at ways of reconciling these two important, if 
not conflicting factors. This would help to ensure the 
relevance of this kind of analysis to "real life" 
situations. A possible way to achieve this would be to 
utilize Porter's framework, with in depth statistical 
analysis in certain key areas such as capital intensity and 
advertising.
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APPENDIX I
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MARKET ATTRACTIVENESS
AND BUSINESS POSITION
ATTRACTIVENESS OF YOUR MARKET STATUS/POSITION OF YOUR BUSINESS
MARKET FACTORS
Size (Value, units or both) 
Size of key segments 
Growth rate per year:
Total
Segments
Diversity of market 
Sensitivity to price, service
features and external
factors 
Cyclicalitiy 
Seasonality 
Bargaining power of upstream
suppliers 
Bargaining power of downstream
suppliers
COMPETITION
Types of competitors 
Degree of competition 
Changes in type and mix
Entries and "Exits'
Changes in share 
Substitution by new
technology 
Degrees and types of
integration
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
Contribution margins 
Leveraging factorsy^rsnch as
economies of scale and
experience 
Barriers to entry or exit (both
financial and non-financial)
Capacity utilisation
Your share (in equivalent terms) 
Your share of key segments 
Your annual growth rate
Total
Segments
Diversity of your participation 
Your influence on the market
Lags or leads in your sales
Bargaining power of your
suppliers 
Bargaining power of your
customers
Where you fit, how you compare,
in terms of products,
marketing capability, service
production strength
financial strength, manage- 
ment 
Segments~"you~~liave "entered 'or'
left
Your relative share change 
Your vulnerability to new
technology 
Your own level of integration
Your margins
Your -scale -and experience
Barriers to your entry or exit 
(both financial and non- 
financial)
Your capacity utilisation
TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
Maturity and volatity
Complexity
Differentiation
Patents and copyrights 
Manufacturing process 
technology required
SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS IN 
YOUR ENVIRONMENT
Social attitudes and trends
Laws and government agency
regulations 
Influence with pressure
groups and government
representatives 
Human factors, such as
unionisation and
community acceptance
Your ability to cope with change
Depth of your skills
Types of your technological
skills
Your patent protection 
Your manufacturing technology
Your company's responsiveness
and flexibility 
Your company's ability to cope
Your company's aggressiveness
Your company's relationships
Source: "Strategic Market Planning - Problems and Analytical 
Approaches" - Abell and Hammond - Prentice Hall, 1979
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APPENDIX 2
PORTER'S MARKET SHARE/PROFITABILITY CURVE
Profitability
Market Share
Source: Porter, M.E. "Competitive Strategy- techniques
for analysing industries and competitors" The
Free Press, New York 1980.
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APPENDIX 3
GLOSSARY OF BREWING TERMS
Beer An alcoholic drink made 
barley, hops and water.
from fermented
Draught beer Beer sold direct from a tank or barrel
for immediate consumption.
Packaged beer Beer sold in a bottle or can.
Lager
Bitter 
A brewer 
A brewery
A pale, bottom fermented beer universally 
drunk thoughout the world.
The trditional top fermented beer of the UK. 
A company actively brewing.
A site where beer is brewed and excise duty 
paid on it.
Managed house A public house owned by a brewery company
and managed by an employee of the company.
Tenanted house A public house owned by a brewery company
an let to a tenant, who runs it as his/hers 
own business.
Tied estate
Free trade
Take home
Barrel
The managed and tenanted public houses 
and off-licenced premised owned by a brewer.
Licensed premises, including public 
houses, clubs, off-licensed premises, 
supermarkets, hotels and resturants, not 
owned by a brewer. Some premises may be 
obliged to take a some of their throughput 
of beer, wine or spirits from one or more 
brewers, having entered into a short-term 
contractual obligation to do so.
Off-licensed premises, mainly supermarkets, 
trade grocers, and specialist off-licences 
through which packaged beer and wines and 
spirits are sold mainly for comsumption at 
home. This trade is largely free (non 
brewery owned) but is partly tied (because 
some off-licences are owned by brewers.
A measure of beer (288 pints)
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APPENDIX
LIST OF VARIABLES EXCLUDED FOR EACH BREWER IN THE
STATISTICAL GROUPING PROCEDURE DUE TO A LACK OF DATA OR 
VARIANCE OVER TIME.
BREWER VARIABLES
Bass
Allied
Scots & Newc
Guinness
Whitbread
Boddingtons
Thwaites
G. Whitley
M. Brown
Vaux
Wolves & Dudley
Marstons
Young
Courage
None
None
Breweries
Breweries, Pubs, Brands
Brands
Breweries, Pubs, Brands, Adverts
Breweries, Brands
None
Breweries
None
Breweries, Adverts
Breweries, Pubs, Brands, Adverts
Breweries, Brands, Adverts
Breweries, brands
APPENDIX 5
THE FORMAT OF QUESTIONS USED IN INTERVIEWS WITH MANAGERS IN 
THE UK BREWING INDUSTRY AND THE COMPANIES INTERVIEWED
1. How has the company developed since 1972?
-covering overall product, management (in particular 
marketing) and manufacturing developments.
2. What are the company's current strategic policies and
	decisions in the fields of; 
a. capacity,
b. distribution- supermarkets, free trade, tied trade etc,
c. product development- lager, cider, bitter etc,
d. diversification,
e. overseas interests.
3. Who are your main competitors?
a. How do they compete?- ie price, advertising, loans,
quality etc. 
b. Do you think there are lessons to learn from them? -If
so, what? 
c. Do you monitor their moves? If so, how?
What do you see as your "market" or "markets"?
5. Do you have any formal methods of strategy evaluation?
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6. What indicators of success fo you employ?- ie ROI, ROE, 
market-share etc.
7. Future developments- if this area has not been covered 
elsewhere.
THE BREWERS INTERVIEWED
Allied (Taylor Walker, Allied*s London division)
Whitbread (Ex marketing manager)
Guinness (Financial services manager and marketing
manager.)
Scottish and Newcastle (Public relations manager)
Wolverhampton and Dudley (Marketing manager)
Greene King (Marketing manager)
Marstons (Marketing manager)
Young (Group sales manager)
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APPENDIX 6
STATEMENT OF RELATED STUDIES UNDERTAKEN
Attendance of research workshops for postgraduate research 
Attendance of degree courses in statistics and marketing. 
Foundation course in computing and systems analysis.
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